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Rethinking Trademark Fair Use
William McGeveran
ABSTRACT: The ever-expanding scope and strength of trademark rights
has caused justifiable fears of a threat to free expression. In response,
concerned scholars generally focus on perfecting the substance of legal rules
that balance free speech against other goals. This effort is misplaced because
most cases raising these issues in recent years ended in judicial decisions
that favored speech. The real danger arises from the procedural structure of
trademark law’s various “fair use” doctrines, which generate excessive
ambiguity and prolong litigation before ever reaching such positive
outcomes. Resulting administrative costs discourage speakers from using
trademarks expressively in the first place, creating a classic chilling effect.
This Article analyzes problems with trademark fair use comprehensively and
recommends pragmatic reform. Instead of adding more bells and whistles to
already complex law, we should craft simpler affirmative defenses that
reduce uncertainty and allow for quick adjudication.
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INTRODUCTION

Trademark rights have expanded dramatically over time from
consumer-oriented safeguards against the diversion of customers to
comprehensive protectors of brand identity.1 Many observers warn that this
increased scope of trademark protection threatens free speech, including
both dissemination of useful commercial information and discussion,
critique, or parody about famous brands and the culture they embody.2 Yet
final decisions in trademark cases that raised legitimate free speech issues
over the last decade or so usually favor defendants who use trademarks for
purposes of expression.3 Courts ultimately get these cases right under
existing law.
The principal problems lie not in the eventual judicial outcome, but in
the process leading up to that outcome. First, doctrines to accommodate
free speech values that may arise in trademark cases are overlapping,
confusing, volatile, and cumbersome. One prominent trademark
practitioner dubs the ungainly collection of doctrines “Frankenlaw.”4 Even if
the result favors speech, it can be impossible to predict in advance which of
a half dozen standards a court might apply. Second, these doctrines
frequently center on complex fact-intensive analyses that require significant
time and money to resolve. In particular, trademark fair use frequently
devolves into a clumsy alternate means of asking the fundamental question
of trademark law: whether a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s mark is likely to
confuse consumers about the source or affiliation of the respective parties’
1. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1839, 1916 (2007) [hereinafter McKenna, Normative Foundations] (“Succinctly stated, modern
trademark law is industrial policy intended to protect brand value.”). McKenna’s article offers
an interesting and unorthodox historical account of this transformation, arguing that
trademark law always emphasizes protection of producers and merchants from diversion of
customers, not protection of consumers from marketplace confusion. See id. at 1849–73.
2. For some of the best classic discussions of the overall phenomenon of trademark
expansion and its potentially harmful consequences for speech, see generally, e.g., Robert C.
Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection
of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Alex
Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast
with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999). For related books
on this theme that are aimed at the general audience rather than scholars and specialists, see
generally DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL CULTURE
(2005); KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION®: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND
OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY (2005).
3. For this Article’s definition of “expressive uses,” see infra Part II.A. For more on the
recent trend in published cases in favor of expressive uses, see infra Part II.C.
4. Jonathan Moskin, Frankenlaw: The Supreme Court’s Fair and Balanced Look at Fair Use, 95
TRADEMARK REP. 848, 875 (2005).
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products. Discussion of trademark doctrine often overlooks the procedural
or administrative costs resulting from such involved inquiries.5
The lethal combination of uncertain standards with lengthy and costly
litigation creates a classic chilling effect upon the unlicensed use of
trademarks to facilitate speech, even when such uses are perfectly lawful.6
This effect undoubtedly occurs, though admittedly it is difficult to measure
because it occurs far away from the courthouse, through practices that never
find their way into any casebook.7 Markholders policing their portfolios send
cease-and-desist letters attacking virtually any unlicensed use of their
trademarks.8 From television networks to insurance companies, risk-averse
institutional gatekeepers demand expansive rights clearance. Lawyers
counsel clients to avoid the trouble of a potential lawsuit. In response to this
array of powerful entities, speakers either avoid unlicensed uses of
trademarks entirely or withdraw them at the first hint of legal action.
A few recent court decisions demonstrate both the significant speech
interests at stake in such cases and the courts’ tendency to safeguard those
interests with a grab-bag of rationales. Mattel, maker of the BARBIE9 doll,
sued to enjoin many parodies of this cultural icon, including a series of
photographs entitled “Food Chain Barbie,” which “portray a nude Barbie in
danger of being attacked by vintage household appliances”10 and a pop song
called “Barbie Girl” featuring vapid lyrics supposedly sung by Barbie and

5. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2123–
43 (2004). As Bone notes, “[t]he usual approach to analyzing trademark issues focuses on the
substantive benefits and costs of giving firms exclusive rights in marks. . . . The problem with this
substantive approach is that it ignores procedural aspects . . . .” Id. at 2101.
6. See infra Part II.D.
7. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670–73 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Grounding]; James
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 913
(2007); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1899, 1909–16 (2007) (making similar observations across types of intellectual
property); William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to
Educational Uses of Copyrighted Materials in the Digital Age, 52–54 (The Berkman Ctr. for Internet
& Soc’y, Harvard Law Sch., Research Pub. No. 2006-09, 2006), available at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/home/2006-09 (making similar observations about copyright law).
8. See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1838–42 (2007) (noting how the letters and threat of litigation
discourage even fair use); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585, 589–90 (2008) (discussing how cease-and-desist letters are a way for
trademark holders “to expand their trademark rights” even when a case has no merit).
9. As is standard in trademark scholarship and practice, this Article uses capital letters to
identify the trademarks at issue.
10. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796–98 (9th Cir. 2003) (relying
on nominative fair use, see infra Part IV.C). The pictures can be viewed at the photographer’s
website, Tom Forsythe, http://creativefreedomdefense.org/Results.cfm?category=12 (last
visited Sept. 16, 2008).
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Ken.11 Panels of the Ninth Circuit used different doctrines to rule for the
defendants in both cases. AFLAC, perpetrator of television commercials in
which a duck repeatedly “quacks the company’s name in a distinctive, nasal
tone,” sought an injunction against the campaign of a candidate running
against Ohio’s then-Governor, Bob Taft, for distributing Internet ads in
which a cartoon duck with the Governor’s head squawked “TaftQuack!”
when “ducking” questions.12 The court protected this core political speech,
but relied in part on different reasoning than the Ninth Circuit’s BARBIE
cases. The Seventh Circuit used still another doctrine to protect sales by the
Chicago Tribune of t-shirts carrying a front-page headline, “The joy of six,”
celebrating the Chicago Bulls’ sixth NBA championship.13 Fairly consistent
favorable outcomes belie the chaotic reasoning in this body of case law.
It is time to rethink trademark fair use. A legal rule that reaches the
perfect outcome every time still fails if its operation also systematically
discourages the very activities it is intended to protect. The free speech
features of trademark law must encompass not only the substantive policy
balance already incorporated in core trademark doctrine, but also greater
integration of First Amendment requirements, increased predictability in
legal standards, and less delay and cost in litigation.14 This Article advances
those goals by proposing pragmatic reforms to the structural factors creating
a chilling effect.
Part II of this Article, after some brief definitions of terms, explores the
substantive successes and procedural failures of trademark doctrine that
create a systematic chilling effect. Part III considers the problems with
applying the touchstone “likelihood of confusion” test to free expression.
Part IV critiques five individual doctrines that defendants and courts invoke
in these cases; with the possible exception of a new statutory rule in federal
trademark dilution cases, all of them are volatile and slow.
Finally, Part V suggests new ways of thinking about trademark fair use
that focus on the lessons learned from existing doctrines. It proposes less
emphasis on achieving the perfect balance between confusion prevention
and speech protection in every case, because doing so requires more

11. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on a
First Amendment defense, see infra Part IV.D, and dilution safe harbors, see infra Part IV.E). An
appendix to the case reproduces the lyrics. See id. at 909 (“I’m a Barbie girl, in my Barbie
world/Life in plastic, it’s fantastic/You can brush my hair, undress me everywhere.”).
12. Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685–86 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(relying on likelihood of confusion, see infra Part III, as well as state dilution law and federal
dilution safe harbors, see infra Part IV.E).
13. Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2001) (relying on a
section 33(b)(4) defense, see infra Part IV.B). Curiously, the plaintiff markholder apparently
had no connection to the books that first popularized this turn of phrase. Cf. ALEX COMFORT,
THE JOY OF SEX (1977).
14. See generally William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205 (2008) (articulating these goals).
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elaborate rules and fact-intensive inquiries. Instead, we should craft simpler
affirmative defenses that immunize particular categories of expressive uses,
thereby reducing uncertainty and allowing for quick adjudication. We also
should rethink other procedures to make defenses available earlier in
litigation and with less entanglement in likelihood of confusion issues.
II. THE TROUBLE WITH TRADEMARK FAIR USE
A. DEFINING EXPRESSIVE USES AND FAIR USES
Before moving further, two key concepts, expressive use and fair use,
require definition for purposes of this Article.15
In the standard account, a trademark serves as shorthand to help
consumers identify with accuracy the products they want to buy; such
reliable indicators reduce inefficient search costs and ensure that producers
reap the rewards of satisfying customers because they, not an impostor,
retain the benefit of increased goodwill and future repeat purchases.16 This
is the “source identification” function of trademarks.
“Expressive” uses of trademarks convey an articulable message rather
than, or in addition to, the traditional function of source identification.17
The boundary is not always obvious and there will be close cases. But, some
categories of expressive uses can be identified with relative ease, including:
use of a mark (or parts of one) to convey a message unrelated to the
markholder (e.g., using the word “apple” to talk about fruit rather than
computers); use of a mark to identify a markholder or a product in order to
convey a message about it (e.g., the “Food Chain Barbie” photographs and
“Barbie Girl” song); or use of a mark to draw on its meaning or associations
to illustrate or enliven a message about something else entirely (e.g., the use
of the AFLAC allusion in the TaftQuack advertisement). Thus, expressive
uses can arise in such diverse situations as comparative advertising, parody,
references in books or films, or news reporting.

15. A few other small points about terminology: first, although there are declaratory
judgment cases in which the alleged infringer is the plaintiff, unless otherwise indicated, this
Article assumes the more typical situation involving a defendant’s allegedly infringing uses of a
plaintiff’s mark. Second, this Article uses the words “mark” and “trademark” to encompass all
forms of protected marks, including service marks and certification marks, and refers to both
goods and services as “products.” Any differences separating these categories are not germane
to the analysis pursued here.
16. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995);
Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies and Fair Use, 50 ARIZ.
L. REV. 157, 162–63 (2008); Bone, supra note 5, at 2104–08; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–88 (2005)
[hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark
Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L & ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987); McGeveran, supra note 14, at
1207–08.
17. See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 400 (making a similar distinction).
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This Article sets aside some other important types of uses because they
generally fall outside this definition, even though it is possible to imagine
particular situations where they might fit. Usually, defendants in these
scenarios use a mark and do not surround it with other explicitly
communicative matter. For example, a defendant who makes or sells a
baseball cap with a YANKEES logo18 or a t-shirt that says “BARBIE”19 merely
reproduces a trademark and adds no further expressive content or context
(although the eventual wearer might do so20). These uses often involve
merchandising rights,21 and would only be expressive uses if the trademark
were altered to add additional articulable expression.22
Several Internet uses also fall outside the range of expressive uses under
this definition, including most unlicensed uses of trademarks in domain
names, metatags, and advertising keywords.23 Here again, added expression
(such as the gripe site domain name “Ballysucks.com” as opposed to simply
repeating the trademark BALLY) might qualify as an expressive use.24 But,

18. See McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 1, at 1911 (discussing the example of
the YANKEES logo).
19. See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 402 (discussing the example of the BARBIE t-shirt).
20. Those who buy and eventually wear the cap or t-shirt probably engage in some form of
expression by showing their allegiance to the team or the doll (or perhaps, as can be seen on
the clothes in the halls of any high school, engaging in ironic critique). Such downstream users,
however, are not themselves subject to trademark liability for buying or wearing the trademarkemblazoned clothes, so we need not worry about their potential legal defenses. The producer
or seller usually does not engage in expressive use as defined here.
21. See generally Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg, Inc., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1975); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory
or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005).
22. Instead of a YANKEES logo, the cap might be an expressive use if it had a YANKEES
SUCK logo of the type once favored by formerly insecure Red Sox fans. See, e.g., CafePress,
http://shop.cafepress.com/yankees-suck_ (last visited Sept. 13, 2008) (offering a bewildering
array of anti-YANKEES merchandise); Posting of Mike Madison to Madisonian Blog, Saw ‘Em
Off, http://madisonian.net/archives/2007/01/24/saw-em-off/ (Jan. 24, 2007) (describing a
University of Texas lawsuit over the sale of clothes to archrival Texas A&M supporters featuring
a parody of the Longhorns’ trademarked logo with its horns sawed off); cf. Bd. of Supervisors v.
Smack Apparel Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664 (E.D. La. 2006) (ruling against a vendor whose
sports merchandise might qualify as expressive use, although it is a close call). Likewise, a t-shirt
sold by the National Organization for Women that reads “This is what Barbie ought to look like”
qualifies as an expressive use. Now Store, T-shirt: This Is What Barbie Ought to Look Like,
http://www.now.org/cgi-bin/store/TS-BAR.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2008).
23. See generally, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005);
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v.
Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper
Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
24. See generally Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal.
1998). In addition, some cases might contain both expressive uses as defined here and the
online uses excluded by this definition. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ.
4607(RJS), 2008 WL 2755787, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008) (considering eBay’s expressive use
of the TIFFANY brand name in its own advertising and home page to indicate the availability of
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in the emerging and shifting Internet environment, it is unclear just how to
interpret the dialogue between a consumer entering a URL or search term
into a computer and the automated response.25 As online behavior develops
and our empirical understanding of it improves, we may be prepared to
recognize certain types of these Internet uses as “expressive” in the sense
defined above, but for now this Article sets them aside. To be sure, these
excluded topics can present important controversies and sometimes can
involve free speech.26 But such situations require analysis different than the
one pursued in this Article.
The Article uses the terminology of “fair use” much more broadly and
prescriptively than it is generally used in case law. Rather than referring
exclusively to any particular legal rule, a fair use here is any use of a
trademark that should be permitted by the law. A fair use doctrine could be
any aimed at identifying those permissible uses. Note that some expressive
uses still might infringe on trademarks and thus would not be fair uses. That
policy determination cannot be made without considering the trade-offs
between speech interests and the source identification functions of
trademarks.27 The remainder of this Part begins to consider that balance.
B. INCREASING CONFLICT OVER EXPRESSIVE USES
The combination of broader trademark rights, the greater centrality of
brands as our cultural currency, and the additional boost of the Internet
have all contributed to making conflicts over expressive uses more frequent
in recent years. These same phenomena greatly increase the importance of
developing legal mechanisms to protect fair uses.
Earlier in its history, trademark law rarely intersected with expressive
uses. Trademark protection was conferred on a narrow range of uses,
originally involving old-fashioned “branding” in the literal sense—often the
name of a product or its maker, affixed to the item.28 Gradually, however,
TIFFANY jewelry on the site, as well as eBay’s purchase from Google and Yahoo! of online
sponsored links using the TIFFANY name).
25. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1637 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Janis,
Contextualism] (“It is presently impossible to know what meaning consumers attach to search
terms and search results or what expectations flow from the use of different search methods.”);
Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 521–25
(2005) [hereinafter Goldman, Deregulating] (“Simply put, one cannot make any legallysupportable inferences about searcher objectives based on the keywords used.”).
26. See generally, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing a case
where the defendant used a domain name similar to plaintiff’s in order to criticize his stance on
homosexuality); People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir.
2001) (discussing a case where plaintiff PETA sued defendant for registering the domain
peta.org and titling the website “People Eating Tasty Animals”).
27. McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1209–11.
28. See Zeller v. LaHood, 627 F. Supp. 55, 59–60 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (upholding the common
law requirement of affixation (citing DeLong Hook & Eye Co. v. Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co., 130
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consumer marketing grew well beyond these original techniques, and today
brand management is a complex, sophisticated business specialty and a
career path all its own.29 Trademark rights expanded to keep pace. The
evolution began at least as early as the original Lanham Act’s extension of
liability to encompass consumers’ confusion not only about source, but also
about “affiliation, connection, or association” between the plaintiff and the
defendant, and about the plaintiff’s “sponsorship or approval” of defendant
or defendant’s products.30 Trademark dilution law31 continued the trend by
prohibiting uses that, while not confusing in the traditional sense, can “blur”
or “tarnish” the power of trademarks.32
Meanwhile, the ubiquity of branding—the very trend that has fueled
this expansion of trademark law—now makes discussion of trademarks more
essential to open discourse than ever before. Increasingly, the subjects of
shared conversation are branded companies, branded goods and services, or
branded “experiences.”33 Their cultural importance makes trademarks
increasingly necessary in any realistic portrayal of modern society.34 As the
creator of “Food Chain Barbie” said, “In a world dominated by brands,
artists have to be able to comment on those brands to speak directly to the
world around them.”35 “Culture jamming” and related techniques of
mockery and interference with brand names and logos represent an artistic
and ideological protest to “challenge the boundaries of corporate identity in
public space.”36

N.E. 765 (Ill. 1921))); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 16:23 (4th ed. 2007).
29. See generally JENNIFER GOODMAN ET AL., VAULT CAREER GUIDE TO MARKETING AND
BRAND MANAGEMENT (2006); WETFEET INSIDER GUIDE, CAREERS IN BRAND MANAGEMENT (2007).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000); see McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 1, at
1901–04. For a general summary of other such doctrinal expansions, see id. at 1904–15.
31. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985–86
(1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)).
32. See Mary LaFrance, Steam Shovels and Lipstick: Trademarks, Greed, and the Public Domain, 6
NEV. L.J. 447, 462–88 (2005); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 546–61 (2008).
33. See CELIA LURY, BRANDS: THE LOGOS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 37–45 (2004)
(describing dynamic marketing techniques that insert brand image into personal and cultural
experiences where “the brand is staged as a performance or an event of some kind”).
34. See, e.g., Monroe Friedman, The Changing Language of a Consumer Society: Brand Name
Usage in Popular American Novels in the Postwar Era, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 927, 931–34 (1985)
(empirically documenting a huge increase in the number and variety of brand names used in
bestselling novels from 1946 to 1975).
35. Forsythe, supra note 10; see also Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to Be American:
Reflections on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech
Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 528–31 (1996) (describing postmodern analysis about the
conversion of trademarks to consumption objects and aspects of self-identity).
36. Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 503 (2006); see
Matthew Rimmer, The Black Label: Trade Mark Dilution, Culture Jamming and the No Logo Movement,
5 SCRIPTED 70, 76–82 (2008), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol5-1/
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Even beyond discussion of the brands themselves, trademarks often
provide the “most vivid metaphors” and “most compelling imagery”
available, precisely because they are carefully selected and then relentlessly
repeated in our advertising-saturated world.37 Our most widely shared
cultural references now come from advertising, not literature or scripture.
As Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss remarked, “Betty Crocker has replaced Hestia
in the public consciousness.”38
The advent of the Internet further accelerated the trend toward more
expressive use conflicts in two ways. First, the rise of a “remix” culture in
which anyone can easily copy and change trademarked logos—and then
distribute those alterations—created a new sort of expressive use that was
comparatively rare in the past.39 Comment and mockery by independent
individuals now spreads to a potentially global audience. Second, while this
surge in the number of potential infringements poses challenges to
markholders, the same underlying technology also assists them greatly in
policing their marks. The searchability of the Internet allows markholders to
locate expressive uses of their marks that would never before have come to
their attention.40 Tracing control of a website often can lead directly to the
alleged infringer’s responsibility for an expressive use. The site may even
provide a convenient means to contact the would-be defendant with a ceaseand-desist demand.41
rimmer.pdf (reviewing scholarly discussion of culture-jamming, “No Logo” movement, and
related trends); Adbusters Media Foundation, About Adbusters, http://www.adbusters.org/
about/adbusters (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (describing activity of “a global network of culture
jammers and creatives who are working to change the way information flows and meaning is
produced in our society”).
37. Kozinski, supra note 2, at 973 (“Trademarks are often selected for their effervescent
qualities, and then injected into the stream of communications with the pressure of a firehose
by means of mass media campaigns.”). For examples of brand-name imagery in politics and
culture, see, for example, Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act—A Consumer
Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189, 1209 (2006) (noting Walter
Mondale’s use of the advertising slogan “Where’s the Beef?” in a presidential campaign);
NELLY, Grillz, on SWEATSUIT (Universal Records 2005) (“I got a grill I call penny candy, you
know what that means? / It look like Now and Laters, gumdrops, jelly beans . . . . Mouth got
colors like a Fruit Loop Box.”); KATY PERRY, I Kissed a Girl, on ONE OF THE BOYS (Capitol Music
Group 2008) (“The taste of her cherry Chapstick.”); Buffy the Vampire Slayer: The Pack (WB
television broadcast Apr. 7, 1997) (a girl insults an overweight classmate by asking, “Shouldn’t
you be hovering over the football stadium with Goodyear written on you?”).
38. Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 424. Hestia is the Greek goddess of the hearth.
39. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004) (advocating a free culture where
innovators are protected, but follow-on creators are nearly free to revise and innovate);
MCLEOD, supra note 2 (arguing against strict copyright enforcement); Katyal, supra note 36
(discussing “semiotic disobedience” and the purposeful appropriation of intellectual property).
40. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 586 (2004) (noting the same effect on copyright
enforcement).
41. See Posting of Eric Turkewitz to New York Personal Injury Law Blog, Avis Tells Me
Cease and Desist on Use of Its Logo, http://www.newyorkpersonalinjuryattorneyblog.com/
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In response to these combined forces of legal, cultural, and
technological change, the fair use mechanisms of trademark law shifted.
The increased scope of trademark protection removed some of the
threshold limits on markholders’ rights. These expansions then forced
defendants to fall back on a hodgepodge of fair use doctrines more
frequently. In essence, as the “front end” of the analysis allowed a greater
range of uses to engender potential liability, the “back end” of the analysis
involving defenses and exceptions became more important. The next two
sections explain the results of that reorientation: generally stable substantive
protection in litigated cases for fair uses, and disastrous procedural
mechanisms that impose a chilling effect upon a much greater universe of
expressive uses.
C. THE GOOD NEWS: CORRECT OUTCOMES
In general, the results of reported cases involving expressive uses (as
defined above) have stabilized in the last decade and now favor the
expressive uses most of the time. A number of infamous decisions against
expressive uses that critics occasionally cite are outdated and might well
come out differently under more recent doctrine.42 Of course, courts still
issued some expressive use rulings during the last decade that invite
potential disapproval,43 but few legal issues are so plain that courts never get
them “wrong.” Most of the time, most courts reach correct substantive
outcomes concerning trademark fair use. If the sky is falling, these few
troubling outcomes are not the reason.
In the last few years, very few judicial decisions have suppressed
expressive uses.44 One terrible unpublished district court opinion, Freecycle
2007/10/avis-tells-me-cease-and-desist-on-use.html (Oct. 23, 2007) (describing how an attorney
for the markholder left a comment on a blog post alleging that use of a logo as an illustration
infringed its trademark).
42. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994);
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43–45 (2d Cir. 1994); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v.
Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398–99 (8th Cir. 1987); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Inc., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979). For more insight into potential outcomes under
current doctrine, see generally infra Part IV, and particularly Part IV.D, which discusses new
approaches to First Amendment defenses.
43. See generally, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing
summary judgment for defendants in a case concerning the use of Rosa Parks’s name in a song
title); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997)
(granting injunctive relief for Dr. Seuss’s publisher against a company publishing an O.J.
Simpson parody book); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D.
Minn. 1998) (granting injunctive relief for Dairy Queen against a movie company that wanted
to name a comedy film Dairy Queens). I do not necessarily consider all of these rulings incorrect
given their underlying facts, but they are open to criticism.
44. One published case had a positive outcome, but only for troubling reasons. SMJ Group,
Inc. v. Lafayette Restaurant LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), concerned a labor group
leafleting outside a restaurant. The leaflets included the restaurant’s logos. In considering a
motion for a preliminary injunction against the labor group, the court found a likelihood of
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Network v. Oey,45 was overturned promptly on appeal46 after receiving
significant attention from scholars and activists.47 Two other short
unpublished district court opinions, Ultimate Creations, Inc. v. THQ, Inc.48
and Jones v. Ground Zero Entertainment,49 are open to critique, but the facts of
both cases also provide potential justifications for the courts’ decisions.
Many more lawsuits in the last few years vindicated expressive uses. In several
instances, courts dismissed markholders’ suits over expressive uses as early as
the pleading stage.50 More often, defendants relied on various fair use
doctrines to win summary judgment.51 The expressive uses vindicated
success on the merits concerning infringement but denied the injunction for lack of irreparable
harm based upon its “unique facts.” Id. at 291–92, 295. Unfortunately, the fact pattern—
expressive use to criticize a markholder—is far from “unique.” The court later ordered a
stipulated dismissal with prejudice, presumably because of a settlement. SMJ Group, No. 06 Civ.
1774 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2007) (stipulated order dismissing case with prejudice).
45. Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, No. CV 06-173 (D. Ariz. May 11, 2006) (order granting
preliminary injunction).
46. Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’g No. CV 06-173 (D.
Ariz. May 11, 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction).
47. See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1206 (“[The district court opinion] was shocking, and
so the Freecycle case became a cause célèbre—not because it was typical, but because it was
unusual.”).
48. Ultimate Creations, Inc. v. THQ, Inc., No. CV-05-1134-PHX-SMM, 2008 WL 215827
(D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2008). In Ultimate Creations, the court denied summary judgment for a
defendant who marketed a video game that allegedly appropriated trademarked elements of a
professional wrestler’s persona; the defendant raised a fair use defense, but the court held that
a jury could find bad faith rather than fair use. Id. at *4 (noting a jury could rely on the
substantial number of trademarked features that players of the game can add to their character,
as well as past failed licensing negotiations between the parties, to deny fair use defense); see also
Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253-RGK (PLAx), 2005 WL 878090, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) (similar result on similar facts, but on motions to dismiss and motions to strike).
49. Jones v. Ground Zero Entm’t, No. 05 Civ. 6461 (JSR), 2006 WL 1788949 (S.D.N.Y.
June 28, 2006). The very brief opinion in Jones, concerning the prominent use of rapper Lil’
Kim’s name on the cover of a DVD, only stated that there was enough likelihood of success on a
claim of false endorsement to justify a preliminary injunction. Id. at *2 (rejecting both
section 33(b)(4) and nominative use defenses for purposes of preliminary injunctive relief
because of the likelihood that the defendants’ use falsely suggested the plaintiff’s endorsement
of the DVD). The court later ordered stipulated dismissals as to most defendants in the case. Id.
Finally the case settled.
50. See generally, e.g., Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962
(C.D. Cal. 2007); Arnold v. ABC, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1747(GBD), 2007 WL 210330 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 2007); see also Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 415 (1st Cir. 2007)
(affirming a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); cf. Romantics v.
Activision Publ’g, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 884, 886–88 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2008) (denying a
preliminary injunction against expressive use based largely on First Amendment grounds).
51. See generally, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008);
BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, No. 606-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007); Note
Family, Inc. v. Vivendi Universal Games, Inc., No. 05-126-DRH, 2007 WL 2565970 (S.D. Ill. Sept.
4, 2007); Griffith v. Fenrick, 486 F. Supp. 2d 848 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A.
v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir.
2007); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2006);
GTFM, LLC v. Universal Studios, Inc., No. 02 CV.0506 (RO), 2006 WL 1377048 (S.D.N.Y. May
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included parody,52 reference to marks and their holders for purposes of
identification,53 use of marks as parts of fictional works,54 and sometimes
harsh criticism.55
In sum, final judicial decisions that curtail expressive use have become
rare. Of course, published decisions represent only a smidgen of all
expressive use lawsuits.56 As the next Section explains, what happens outside
this small and unrepresentative sample presents less cheerful news.
D. THE BAD NEWS: A CHILLING EFFECT
As explained further in Parts II and III of this Article, likelihood of
confusion analysis and the “back end” defenses and limitations for
expressive uses have two great disadvantages compared to “front end”
definitional limitations on liability: they are delineated less clearly, and they
require lengthier litigation. Expressive uses become riskier as a result.
Numerous scholars have documented similar problems with copyright fair
use and offered reform proposals,57 but the same has not been chronicled in
trademark law—where, as we shall see, the situation actually can be worse in
a number of respects.
The lack of clarity increases risk in several ways. First of all, it is difficult
to ascertain precisely which doctrines will determine if a particular
expressive use qualifies as fair use; the boundaries between them are not
clear, and different jurisdictions recognize different forms and combinations

16, 2006); see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2872 (2008) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of declaratory judgment protecting expressive use).
52. See, e.g., Burnett, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (discussing a vulgar spoof of Carol Burnett and
her “Charwoman” character in the TV comedy The Family Guy); GTFM, 2006 WL 1377048, at *3
(considering a mockery of FUBU clothing line in comedy film); Louis Vuitton, 464 F. Supp. 2d at
498 (discussing “Chewy Vuitton” dog toys).
53. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib., 505 F.3d at 818 (discussing baseball players’ names in fantasy
baseball game); Universal Commc’n Sys., 478 F.3d at 413 (involving the name of a company in the
title of an online message board concerning its stock price and finances); Romantics, 532 F.
Supp. 2d at 887 (considering the use of a band’s name to identify it as the original performer of
a song licensed for use in the Guitar Hero video game).
54. See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (using the features of the plaintiff’s
business in a video game set in a fictional version of the business’s neighborhood).
55. See, e.g., Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (discussing the use of portmanteaus
“Walocaust” and “Wal-Queda” to attack WAL-MART); BidZirk, 2007 WL 3119445 at *6
(examining postings of consumer complaints about the markholder’s services).
56. Every year in the last decade, there have been at least 3000 trademark suits filed, but
the largest number of reported cases in any of those years was 101. See Port, supra note 8, at 612,
618.
57. See generally, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007);
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Pierre
N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990); Michael J. Madison,
Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2005);
Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007).
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of the rules.58 Even after litigants and courts identify the correct doctrines,
the relevant arguments and defenses suffer from serious vagueness.
Defending expressive uses in a full lawsuit also becomes extremely
expensive.59 Although they are sometimes intended to serve as initial
screening mechanisms, the various trademark fair use doctrines do not
facilitate early adjudication in practice.60 The photographer who created
“Food Chain Barbie” reported that he spent five months searching for legal
representation after Mattel sued him and said, “A long list of attorneys
suggested that I just give up, since I hadn’t made any money anyway.”61 The
ACLU finally agreed to represent him and enlisted a large California law
firm to handle the case pro bono.62 The overall defense costs for the
litigation, which included closely integrated trademark and copyright claims,
eventually topped two million dollars.63 Most others in his position, lacking
free legal assistance, would back down.64
An artist or a small business has little capacity to resist when facing
possible suit from a litigious trademark holder, unpredictable law, and big

58. See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1214–19 (discussing the problems with predictability
and clarity in trademark law).
59. Overall, trademark litigation is quite costly. According to a wide-ranging survey
conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the estimated total median
cost of the smallest-stakes trademark-infringement litigation in 2006 was just over a quarter of a
million dollars; in larger cases with more than a million dollars “at risk,” that figure rose to
$650,000. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25 (2007).
60. See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1220–23 (highlighting the reasons for high costs).
61. Forsythe, supra note 10.
62. Id.
63. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., No. CV99-85432RSWL(RZX), 2004 WL
1454100, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2004) (awarding defendant $1,584,089 in legal fees and
$241,797.09 in costs); Forsythe, supra note 10 (stating that appeals fees and costs of
approximately $300,000 added to the trial court award equaled a total of $2.1 million in fees
and costs). Fee-shifting such as that which occurred in the “Food Chain Barbie” case is relatively
unusual in trademark law, where only “exceptional cases” justify such awards. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a) (2000).
64. Legal fees are a more important consideration than monetary damages. Expressive use
cases, in particular, tend to focus on injunctive relief. Furthermore, the Lanham Act is usually
interpreted to require “some bad intent on the infringer’s part before monetary recovery is
allowed.” 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 30:89. Indeed, one recent study indicates that,
historically, there were damages in only 5.5% of trademark cases. Port, supra note 8, at 622.
Thus, fear of damages—as opposed to attorney’s fees and other litigation costs—should not
contribute to the chilling effect as much as it might in copyright law, which has a statutory
damages scheme. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000). This assumes, of course, that would-be
defendants in expressive use cases make accurate and rational risk judgments—perhaps a
questionable empirical assertion. To the extent that fear of monetary liability does contribute to
the chilling effect, one might consider further reducing or eliminating the possibility of
damages in expressive use cases. I will set that possibility aside for present purposes and
consider existing damages rules to be a given, just as I assume the expansion of trademark
rights to be a given. Both areas merit further study, however.
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legal bills for a long fight.65 But, large entities—even entire industries—also
respond to these risks conservatively. They adopt trademark rights clearance
practices that avoid all danger of liability, institutionalizing an incentive
structure contrary to free speech values. For example, insurers often
demand rights clearance for every single expressive use of a trademark in
documentaries;66 reality television producers obscure unlicensed trademark
logos captured incidentally in the footage they air;67 Google allows
markholders to ban the use of their trademarks in others’ advertisements;68
and the virtual world Second Life generally forbids graphical items created
by individuals if they incorporate trademarks.69 These policies, far in excess
of legal requirements, are designed to eliminate even the tiniest risk of
trademark disputes. The excessive caution of these gatekeepers creates and
maintains a “clearance culture” with a particularly problematic effect on the
many artists or critics who rely on institutional support to disseminate their
speech.70
In this uncertain legal environment, rational markholders get
aggressive. In a recent empirical analysis, Kenneth Port argued that a
continued increase in the number of trademark cases filed, combined with

65. Note that in most of the “happy ending” cases cited above, see supra notes 10–13, 50–
51, the defendants were corporations, some of them quite large. A few others received pro
bono help, and at least one represented himself pro se. See also BOLLIER, supra note 2, at 100
(“Most small-time parodists immediately fold when a large company accuses them of a
trademark violation. Who can afford the legal fees? . . . Typically, the inequality of economic
power between corporation and parodist tends to determine who prevails in trademark
infringement lawsuits.”); Lia Miller, Cosby’s Lawyers See No Flattery in an Imitation, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2006, at C9 (“‘Well-funded media, offline media, they are able to do this . . . . [W]hen
you are a small independent artist, even when you know you are legally right, someone with
money can strong-arm you into bending.’” (quoting a web satirist who received a cease-anddesist letter)); Sean Higgins, Lake O-be-Gone, NAT’L REVIEW ONLINE, Sept. 28, 2005, http://
www.nationalreview.com/comment/higgins200509280816.asp (reporting that a recipient of a
cease-and-desist letter was “not eager to test” a potential fair use defense and instead complied
with the letter).
66. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, AM. UNIV., UNTOLD
STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS 9–10 (2004), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES
_Report.pdf.
67. Gibson, supra note 7, at 918–20.
68. Google, Adwords Trademark Complaint Procedures, http://www.google.com/tm_
complaint_adwords.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2008); see Sarah Lai Stirland, MoveOn.org Reverses:
Allows Critical Ads on Google, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.wired.com/politics/
onlinerights/news/2007/10/moveon (describing how Google’s policy allowed a political group
to bar advertisements criticizing it and noting this policy “far exceeds the requirements of
trademark law”).
69. See VintFalken.com, Coca-Cola Releases Trademark to Second Life Merchants,
http://www.vintfalken.com/coca-cola-releases-trademark-to-second-life-merchants/ (June 28,
2007, 9:44 EST) (describing Coca-Cola’s choice to allow Second Life users to incorporate some
trademarked graphics into individual profiles).
70. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 66, at 9–10; Rothman, supra note 7, at 1911–16.
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decreases in the percentage of cases that reach trial, suggested that
markholders were filing strike suits aimed at forcing quick, favorable
settlements.71 Even more frequent—and harder to measure—are cease-anddesist letters (“C&Ds”). Markholders typically fire off C&Ds even when the
complained-of expressive uses are almost certainly legal under the substance
of current doctrine.72 Such threatening communiqués, printed on embossed
law firm stationery and packed full of impressive legal language and
citations, have been colorfully characterized as “gorilla chest thumping”73
and “trademark extortion.”74 There is little downside to issuing such
demands, and many lawyers consider it standard practice in the face of
virtually any use.75 Elements of trademark doctrine that encourage vigorous
policing of portfolios, particularly the loss of rights in terms that become
generic, actually encourage markholders to send C&Ds.76 Self-censorship of
expressive uses in such circumstances is quite rational and apparently quite
common.
Normally, in situations where defendants are likely to win but plaintiffs
commonly have more resources and a greater stake in the trademark, one
might expect licensing arrangements to emerge and solve the problem. For
at least three reasons, however, it is impossible to rely heavily on voluntary
licensing in these situations. First, and most obviously, securing licenses is
neither easy nor cheap. There is little incentive for large markholders even
71. Port, supra note 8, at 589, 633.
72. One unscientific study of cease-and-desist letters involving both copyright and
trademark claims found significant degrees of compliance even where the intellectual property
claims were weak or potential defenses were strong; over half of the thirty-seven cease-and-desist
letters with legal claims the authors classified as “weak” nonetheless achieved their goal without
resort to litigation. MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV.
SCH. OF LAW, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL
35–36 (2005), http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf. These findings
confirm my sense of trademark attorneys’ experience with C&Ds. It would be difficult to
conduct a more rigorous study of a phenomenon that, by its nature, goes unreported and
unlitigated. Many more examples can be found in two online databases that catalogue legal
threats involving trademarks and other intellectual-property matters. See Chilling Effects
Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/search.cgi_ (last visited Sept. 16, 2008); Citizen
Media Law Project, Legal Threats Database, http://www.citmedialaw.org/database (last visited
Sept. 16, 2008).
73. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers) About
Trademark, http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/faq.cgi#QID250 (last visited Sept. 16,
2008).
74. Port, supra note 8, at 633.
75. See, e.g., Deborah A. Wilcox, Resist Cease and Desist, BUS. LAW TODAY, May–June 2006, at
27, 31 (describing how routinely counsel for some markholders issue cease-and-desist letters);
David V. Radack, Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus., Your Trademark Is Your Business, You Better
Protect It (Sept. 24, 2003), http://www.nfib.com/object/4003488.html (“In the case of an
‘innocent’ or timid infringer, a letter demanding that the infringement cease and desist may be
enough. This is a relatively cheap alternative to going to court.”).
76. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 8, at 1839–40 (describing the policing incentive
created by fear of a trademark becoming generic).
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to respond to numerous low-stakes licensing requests. If they do respond,
presumably pricing would reflect both these transaction costs and the
markholder’s monopoly position. These drawbacks greatly reduce the
effectiveness of licensing mechanisms, especially for smaller-scale expressive
users like artists, bloggers, and new market entrants.77
Second, as James Gibson recently explained, legally unnecessary
trademark licensing produces a feedback effect that further shrinks the
public domain.78 Trademark law defines infringement based upon
consumer understanding. Widespread overcautious licensing fortifies
consumers’ expectations that such licensing is legally required. This altered
understanding of the law, in turn, increases the likelihood that consumers
will be confused in the future by an unauthorized expressive use of a mark,
rendering even more uses infringing. (As Gibson says, “Lather. Rinse.
Repeat.”79) In this respect, the chilling effect of unstable fair use protection
causes more problems for trademark law than does the parallel problem in
copyright law, where the definition of rights does not depend on subjective
public understanding.
The final and most serious objection to relying on licensing arises when
the contemplated expressive use is negative toward the mark. License
requirements give markholders vetoes over criticism and parody of
themselves or their products.80 It encourages only deals that portray
trademarks in a favorable light. Truly consensual agreements to make
favorable expressive uses (involving, say, a large consumer-products
markholder and a Hollywood movie studio) may be mutually beneficial and
perhaps relatively inoffensive to public interests. But pressure to license all
uses would deprive the public of unfettered discourse about products and
their makers.81
In sum, structural aspects of the existing trademark fair use doctrines
deter unlicensed expressive uses of trademarks or, alternatively, encourage
capitulation in the face of legal action. This episodic chilling effect has
77. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1914–16 (discussing the cost-prohibitive drawbacks to
obtaining licensing for creative artists).
78. Gibson, supra note 7, at 907–27; see also Port, supra note 8, at 590 (listing various means
that the current markholder uses to broaden the trademark’s scope and shrink the public
domain).
79. Gibson, supra note 7, at 884; cf. Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 433, 457–59 (2007) (discussing similar “circularities of expectation” in copyright
fair use).
80. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussing
the risk that “a corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its name
in commentaries critical of its conduct”); Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its
Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404, 428–29 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Goldman, Online] (discussing the danger that trademark law may allow trademark
owners to excise unfavorable content selectively).
81. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1914–15.
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grown into a more widespread expectation of licensing that influences both
individuals and institutions in their approach to trademarks. As this riskaverse posture spreads, it fuels its own growth because of the consumerdependent definition of actionable confusion. Licensing is not a viable
solution to the problem.
A procedural framework in which expressive uses of trademarks become
less risky should reduce the chilling effect on expressive uses. To be sure, no
amount of legal harmonization or procedural reform can eliminate power
asymmetry between individual critics and large institutional markholders,
but improvements of degree should be possible. With clearer law and
simpler, shorter litigation, both individuals and institutions should be more
likely to engage in expressive uses and more likely to persist in those uses
when faced with the prospect of legal action. Presumably markholders
should, in turn, be less likely to threaten or pursue litigation that is clearly
frivolous.
However, achieving this recalibration may require new thinking about
the place of consumer confusion in trademark law. As Part III explains,
breathing room for fair uses requires toleration, on the margins, of some
degree of consumer confusion.
III. THE TROUBLE WITH LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Trademark law aims to preserve the source-identifying meaning of
marks. To do so, the law generally forbids any use of a mark that “is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive” as to the connection
between the plaintiff and the defendant (or their respective products).82
This Part considers two tensions between that central goal and the
enablement of free expression.
A. THE VAGUE AND TIME-CONSUMING TEST
Some commentators believe that the simplest and surest way to
accommodate expressive uses lies within the core “likelihood of confusion”
liability standard of trademark infringement law.83 They argue that a truly
fair use must be distinct enough from the crucial source-identifying function
of the original trademark to avoid confusing consumers who encounter it.
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2000).
83. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 23:11 (criticizing the Third Circuit for
establishing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense and noting with approval that other
circuit courts “have reached similar results by use of their general multi-purpose list of factors”);
Chad J. Doellinger, Nominative Fair Use: Jardine and the Demise of a Doctrine, 1 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 5, ¶ 9 (2003), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v1/
n1/5 (“[N]ominative fair use should be nothing more than a term used to describe a peculiar
fact pattern that, given the specific facts of the case, does not lead to a likelihood of
confusion.”); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 203
(2004) (arguing that finding an absence of likelihood of confusion is a superior mechanism for
handling free speech in trademark cases).
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Judge Pierre Leval, for example, has suggested that a successful parody
avoids likelihood of confusion by definition because “it must summon up
the image of the original while conveying to readers that it is not the
original. If it fails in the second message, so that people think that it is the
original, the whole point of the parody will be lost.”84 Similarly, courts often
reason that comparative advertising should be allowed precisely (and only)
when it distinguishes between the defendant’s product and the plaintiff’s
product.85 A number of prominent trademark experts (notably Professor J.
Thomas McCarthy in his influential trademark treatise, as well as Judge
Leval) advocate that courts should almost always use the likelihood of
confusion yardstick to measure defendants’ arguments involving expressive
uses.86
In a few cases a plaintiff may have so little evidence of actionable
confusion that a court can brush the claim aside swiftly.87 Absent unusual
situations, such as very strong evidence of actual confusion, however, most
trademark infringement cases turn on the application of a complex
multifactor test. Although its precise composition differs from one circuit to
the next, the fundamental attributes remain largely the same.88 Under the
various circuits’ tests, courts compare the plaintiff’s mark to the defendant’s
use of it, generally emphasizing considerations such as the degree of
similarity between them, the “strength” of the plaintiff’s mark, evidence of
actual confusion of consumers, improper intent of the defendant, and the
manner in which consumers encounter the disputed trademarks and uses in

84. Leval, supra note 83, at 203; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog,
LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 259 (4th Cir. 2007) (deciding parody use based on the likelihood of
confusion test); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 1996)
(same); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (same).
Judge Leval also argued that likelihood of confusion would have been a superior basis for
decisions in several other cases. Leval, supra note 83, at 188–98, 202–07.
85. See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924); August Storck K.G. v.
Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th
Cir. 1968); see Mark McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 54, on file with the Iowa Law Review) [hereinafter McKenna,
Trademark Use] (explaining, without advocating the position taken, in Smith v. Chanel that
“comparative advertising is not a defense to trademark infringement in the true sense but
merely an explanation of why confusion may be unlikely”).
86. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 23:11; Leval, supra note 83, at 203; see also Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 236–38 (3d Cir. 2005) (Fisher, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the special nominative use test and
recommending reliance on the likelihood of confusion analysis instead).
87. See, e.g., Freecycle Network v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the
plaintiff did not provide enough evidence for a successful infringement claim).
88. Most of the various circuit courts’ multifactor tests derive from the original
Restatement of Torts, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 731 (1938), and an influential case
decided by Judge Henry Friendly, Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir. 1961). See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, §§ 24:29–24:43 (describing the multifactor
test in all circuit courts, and collecting cases).
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the marketplace.89 Unfortunately, this approach is both unpredictable and
time-consuming.
First, even in garden-variety trademark cases, the test is not known for
its clarity. Courts diverge widely in their statements about the relative weight
of different factors, and “scattered among the circuits are factors that are
clearly obsolete, redundant, or irrelevant, or, in the hands of an experienced
judge or litigator, notoriously pliable.”90 Opinions routinely recite
disclaimers that the test is only a guide, that no single factor is dispositive,
and that additional factors might sometimes merit consideration.91 In
practice, most judges apply this heuristic rather mechanically, running
through all the factors dutifully in every case. Appeals courts routinely
reverse decisions because the lower court omitted factors or strayed from the
standard ones.92 The multifactor test retains its tenacious hold despite its
flaws. In effect, to say that expressive uses should be judged according to the
standard of consumer confusion is to say that courts should feed them into
the typical multifactor test.93
The test has expanded far beyond its roots in cases involving direct
commercial competitors. Its factors have not adapted well to some of these
89. See, e.g., Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (describing
and applying a multifactor test); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.
1979) (same); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.
1977) (same); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(same); Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495 (same).
90. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2006); see also Austin, supra note 16, at 169 (“Testing for likelihood
of confusion is hardly a model of analytical rigor.”); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 721, 749 (2004) (“Predictably, the diverging viewpoints in this area have
produced a muddled body of case law, characterized by such inconsistency among and within
the circuits that it has become difficult to predict how a court will deal with a particular case.”
(citation omitted)).
91. See, e.g., Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding no “single factor as dispositive”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456,
462 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the “factors are not a mechanical checklist”); Petro Stopping
Ctrs., L.P. v. James River Petroleum, Inc., 130 F.3d 88, 91 (4th Cir. 1997) (“These factors are not
of equal importance or equal relevance in every case.”); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d
1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[The] factors are simply a guide.”); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg
Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1987) (“This list is not exhaustive.”).
92. See, e.g., Natural Organics, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 426 F.3d 576, 578–79 (2d Cir.
2005) (reversing for lack of findings to demonstrate the factors had been weighed); Kos
Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 711–12 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Virgin Enters., Ltd. v.
Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 150–51 (2d Cir. 2003) (reversing because the lower court misinterpreted
the proximity factor of the Polaroid test).
93. It is possible that some commentators mean to suggest that some form of alternative
test for confusion should apply to expressive uses, a solution resembling the Ninth Circuit
approach to nominative uses. See infra notes 223–32 and accompanying text. If so, however, this
position is either empty, insufficiently protective of speech, or both. It is empty to suggest an
alternative confusion-based test without explaining what that test should be. More importantly,
asserting that all possible confusion demands liability overprotects against confusion to the
detriment of other values, as described further in Part III.B, infra.
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new contexts. A closer examination of several especially influential factors
demonstrates the poor congruence between the design of the standard and
the considerations relevant to expressive use cases. An empirical study by
Barton Beebe found that the most important factor for determining the
outcome of cases across the different circuits is the similarity of the
defendant’s mark to the plaintiff’s mark.94 This factor makes sense in the
paradigmatic case where a markholder sues an upstart competitor using a
slight variant of the plaintiff’s mark. However, this factor is absurd when
applied to many expressive use scenarios, where often the whole point of a
defendant’s use is to employ the plaintiff’s exact mark or a very minor
variation of it as a means of referring directly to the plaintiff.95 Giving heavy
weight to this factor in expressive use cases, for example, “would lead to the
incorrect conclusion that virtually all nominative uses are confusing” and
therefore infringing.96 Another key factor is the “strength” of the mark,
which measures its degree of distinctiveness. Yet, this attribute may be one of
the reasons a defendant needs to use the mark as a reference point: a host of
associations flows from BARBIE precisely because Mattel has made the mark
so powerful.97 As flawed as the likelihood of confusion standard can be in
cases involving two competing products, it becomes even more unclear and
difficult to apply this standard to expressive uses, a scenario that the
originators of the test never contemplated.
Second, even if a court and litigants can figure out how to apply the
likelihood of confusion standard to expressive use cases, it will not be a
quick process. Delay may be one of the areas where trademark fair use is
even worse than copyright fair use. Although the copyright fair use doctrine
is notoriously fact-dependent, it can be, and often is, asserted by the
94. Beebe, supra note 90, at 1623.
95. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“[I]t is often virtually impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison,
criticism, point of reference or any other such purpose without using the mark.”); Leval, supra
note 83, at 203 (“[Parody] must summon up the image of the original while conveying to
readers that it is not the original.”). For an example of a case where this problem occurred, see
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (weighing the fact
that the defendants parody exactly duplicated some of plaintiff’s strong MICHELOB marks very
heavily against defendant).
96. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002); see Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224–25 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Third
Circuit should ignore “similarity of the marks” factors when considering likelihood of confusion
in nominative use cases).
97. See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 225 (noting that the defendant may need to make
nominative use of a mark “because of its very strength and what it has come to represent”);
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting ROLLS-ROYCE
and BAND-AID, along with BARBIE, as examples of marks used as metaphors that are now an
“integral part of our vocabulary” with a “role outside the bounds of trademark law”); Lyons
P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he strength of the mark may
actually make it easier for the consumer to realize that the use is a parody. Therefore, a strong
mark is not as relevant a factor when the use is that of parody.”).

MCGEVERAN_FINAL

70

1/11/2009 1:56 PM

94 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[2008]

defendant early in litigation. For example, copyright fair use can be raised in
a motion to dismiss based only on the pleadings or as a summary judgment
motion considered prior to any unrelated discovery and any determination
of other matters.98 Depending on the particular situation, the necessary
evidence for copyright fair use cases can be more straightforward.
Much of the high cost of trademark litigation can be explained by the
fact-intensive nature of the likelihood of confusion inquiry. Many factors
present evidentiary challenges, such as considerations of the defendant’s
intent to free ride on plaintiff’s goodwill and the “inchoate quality of the
empiricism” used to determine what consumers in fact perceive.99 Even
trademark dilution claims—which in theory should not depend on
confusion for liability—nonetheless devolve frequently into very similar
factual inquiries about the degree of a mark’s fame and the subjective
“blurring” of marks in the public mind.100 Litigating an elaborate
multifactor analysis requires significant resources for discovery and
attorneys.
In many cases, a plaintiff seeks to demonstrate the presence of actual
confusion by introducing survey evidence. A defendant then has little choice
but to commission a competing survey and initiate a “battle of the
experts.”101 These experts are hideously expensive. Earlier this year, an
Atlanta district court provided a powerful demonstration of this problem.
After receiving a C&D, Charles Smith, “an avid and vocal critic of WalMart,”102 sought a declaratory judgment of his right to sell merchandise
incorporating graphic designs that decried “Walocaust” (and combined Nazi
imagery with the store’s trademarks) as well as “Wal-Queda: The Dime Store
From Hell.”103 Wal-Mart counterclaimed for infringement, dilution,
cybersquatting, and related claims.104 This should have been a clear example
of fair use, allowing straightforward and early adjudication in Smith’s favor.
As usual, that was indeed the court’s ultimate decision, but the real story is
the long and circuitous route to get there in a forty-one page reported

98. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (motion
to dismiss); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (summary judgment); WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10.159 & n.4 (2008) (collecting cases adjudicating copyright fair
use on summary judgment).
99. Austin, supra note 16, at 170.
100. See Austin, supra note 16, at 171–73; Bartow, supra note 90, at 754–56.
101. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 414–16
(7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (bemoaning the quality of survey evidence in many trademark cases
and stating that “[t]he battle of the experts that ensues is frequently unedifying”).
102. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
103. Id. at 1309, 1311–12. Subtlety was not a hallmark of these critiques. See id. at 1309
(describing the image of a “blue stylized bird modeled to resemble a Nazi eagle grasping a
yellow smiley face in the same manner that a Nazi eagle is typically depicted grasping a
swastika”).
104. Id. at 1312–13.
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opinion on cross-motions for summary judgment rendered over two years
after the case was filed.105 Wal-Mart commissioned a survey from a wellknown expert witness in trademark cases and Smith retained a rebuttal
expert.106 The court ultimately excluded most of the Wal-Mart survey after
eighteen pages of extremely detailed analysis.107 It then conducted the
normal multifactor test and finally granted Smith’s summary-judgment
motion. (Smith had pro bono representation from Public Citizen.108
Otherwise it is unlikely any individual would have the wherewithal to litigate
on these terms against the largest employer in the world, and presumably
Wal-Mart could silence the criticisms of a future Mr. Smith.)
Finally, in addition to the expense for discovery of the evidence, blackletter trademark law prevents early resolution of likelihood of confusion
issues. As one court stated the general rule, “Due to the factual nature of
likelihood of confusion, determining whether a likelihood of confusion
exists at the summary judgment stage is generally disfavored because a full
record is usually required to fully assess the facts.”109
Standard likelihood of confusion analysis is a poor fit for evaluating
expressive uses and it imposes significant costs in money and time. These
burdens contribute to the chill on speech, regardless of the ultimate
outcome.
B. THE POOR FIT BETWEEN NORMATIVE VALUES
A more important shortcoming of the likelihood of confusion analysis is
its failure to address the normative value of free speech. The multifactor test
was designed for use in the paradigmatic trademark dispute where the need
to accommodate speech interests does not arise. If two merchants want to
use similar identifiers for their products, both litigants’ interests are

105. Id. at 1311 (action filed on Mar. 6, 2006); id. at 1302 (opinion filed on Mar. 20, 2008).
106. Id. at 1324.
107. Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1317–35.
108. Id. at 1308.
109. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265 (9th Cir. 2001); see GMC
v. Keystone Auto. Indus., 453 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2006) (“These genuine disputes of
material fact render summary judgment inappropriate, a common disposition in evaluating
likelihood of confusion.”); Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“Although likelihood of confusion is a question of fact, the issue may be resolved on summary
judgment where the evidence is so one-sided that there can be no doubt about how the
question should be answered.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); 6 MCCARTHY, supra
note 28, §§ 32:120–32:121 (collecting cases showing a strong presumption against summary
judgment either for or against likelihood of confusion). The comparative weighing of different
factors in the likelihood of confusion analysis to determine the ultimate question of
infringement is sometimes seen as a matter of law. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squib Co. v. McNeilP.P.C. Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1043 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that the standard of review is de novo).
This distinction can be very important to the standard for appellate review, id., but since the
weighing can only occur after the factual determinations have been made, it has little bearing
on the unavailability of early adjudication at the trial court.
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primarily commercial rather than expressive, and neither one of them adds
much additional speech to public discourse. Furthermore, both merchants’
interests align with certain public interests in efficient markets: guarding
against confusion and allowing the best or most informative brand names.110
In expressive use cases, however, another interest joins these. Courts
must factor speech interests (of both the defendant and society) into the
equation and balance them against the economic interests served by
trademarks.111 Expressive trademark uses often advance very important
communicative interests. The AFLAC lawsuit is not the only such case
involving core political speech by political campaigns or citizen protesters.112
Other expressive uses enable criticism, parody, or praise of some of society’s
greatest icons, from BARBIE to Tiger Woods.113
Trademark doctrines typically make no explicit reference to speech
interests, but often this simply conceals the underlying balance between free
expression and other goals.114 Many long-standing trademark doctrines
accommodate speech concerns as part of their inherent structure, including
the loss of rights in generic terms and the variable strength of marks based
on their degree of descriptiveness.115 These well-established principles

110.

As Judge Richard Posner has explained it:
The aim is to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the interest of the seller
of the new product, and of the consuming public, in an arresting, attractive, and
informative name that will enable the new product to compete effectively against
existing ones, and, on the other hand, the interest of existing sellers, and again of
the consuming public, in consumers’ being able to know exactly what they are
buying without having to incur substantial costs of investigation or inquiry.

Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir.
1994).
111. McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1207–11 (analyzing this balance).
112. Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(“TaftQuack” campaign). See generally MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc.,
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (presidential campaign parody of MASTERCARD);
Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal., 856 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(protestors’ use of BRACH logo); Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 489
F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (protestors’ use of Olympic symbol).
113. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A piece of art
that portrays a historic sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture
attaches to such events. It would be ironic indeed if the presence of the image of the victorious
athlete would deny the work First Amendment protection.”); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,
296 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (calling BARBIE “a public figure” and noting, “With Barbie,
Mattel created not just a toy but a cultural icon”).
114. See Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits on Rights
Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352, 353 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.
org/2007/04/25/tushnet.html (“Numerous trademark doctrines serve to cabin the ability of
trademark owners to claim licensing rights.”).
115. See Austin, supra note 16, at 176–77; Leval, supra note 83, at 191–94; Tushnet, supra
note 114, at 353–54. But see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70
TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1169–74 (2003) [hereinafter Ramsey, Descriptive] (arguing that descriptive
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seldom inspire explicit normative discussion in judicial opinions, although
they originate from the same value balance between commercial and speech
interests.116 It cannot be otherwise. As Graeme Austin recently argued, “[A]s
a legal policy matter, equating trademark rights with what consumers might
become confused about cannot be sufficient. Trademark rights need to be
shaped by other legal principles, values, and agendas.”117
Unfortunately, the relative invisibility of this balancing of free speech in
the “normal” case can suggest to the incautious observer (or judge) that
none occurs. This leads, in turn, to a simplistic assumption that any
likelihood of confusion triggers liability—the very antithesis of the careful
harmony that the law must maintain.118 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. despairingly
describes this tendency in a slightly different context:
[The] myth is that the likelihood of confusion analysis can resolve
difficult questions concerning the appropriate scope of trademark
protection. . . . [T]he issue of whether confusion should be
actionable turns not merely on a factual analysis of whether
confusion exists, but on a policy determination that the type of
confusion present warrants legal intervention. Too often courts
simply plug the facts of a case into their version of the Polaroid
factor test [for likelihood of confusion] and pretend that the result
is necessarily a sensible one.119
Courts swayed by the “myth” Lunney describes abdicate responsibility to
safeguard speech interests when considering expressive uses based on the
implicit assumption that trademark law already takes them into account.

trademarks should be treated like generic marks and denied trademark protection in order to
fully accommodate speech values).
116. To be sure, there are important arguments that elements of core trademark doctrine
restrict speech excessively. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 216–24 (1998) (considering the priorrestraint doctrine and injunctive relief in trademark law); Ramsey, Descriptive, supra note 115, at
1098 (arguing that portions of the trademark-infringement doctrine violate the First
Amendment commercial speech doctrine); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of
Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381, 447–57 (2008) [hereinafter Ramsey, Increasing] (arguing
that courts should apply greater First Amendment scrutiny to trademark cases); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and
Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 732–39 (2003) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom] (considering First
Amendment problems with trademark dilution law). Certainly I am not contending that the law
handles these “traditional” scenarios perfectly from the standpoint of protecting speech. But,
their inherent architecture attempts to do so, without much explicit discussion of the fact, unlike
the architecture of the multifactor likelihood of confusion test.
117. Austin, supra note 16, at 175.
118. See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 977 (“Many of these [cases] are close judgment calls,
requiring one to balance interests that point in different directions. Applying these
considerations to a particular set of facts requires a normative judgment about the relative
importance of competing interests.”).
119. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 481 (1999).
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The customary test for consumer confusion becomes the ultimate test for
infringement, without further reference to the interests of the defendant or
of society in protecting and promoting open communication.
Unlike other inherently balanced doctrines in trademark law, the
likelihood of confusion test contains no built-in accommodation for free
expression. While consumer confusion is a necessary condition for
infringement liability, it is not and must never be a sufficient one.120 The
Supreme Court recently stated this principle explicitly, holding that one
particular trademark fair use doctrine remains available even after a
determination that the defendant’s use creates some likelihood of consumer
confusion.121 Some lower courts have since extended that same reasoning to
other trademark fair use doctrines.122
Some expressive uses of trademarks may indeed confuse some
consumers. Consider a case involving the PLAY PEN, a so-called
“gentlemen’s club” in East Los Angeles, whose owners sued the makers of
the popular video game Grand Theft Auto.123 One version of the game allows
players navigating the “East Los Santos” neighborhood to visit a strip club
called the “Pig Pen,” which has some resemblances to the plaintiff’s
establishment.124 The court noted that the game used attributes of the PLAY
PEN to support its “twisted, irreverent image of urban Los Angeles.”125
Fortunately, the court accepted the defendant’s First Amendment argument
as a basis for summary judgment without any extended analysis of likelihood
of confusion.126 The plaintiff, however, had presented survey evidence and

120. Cf. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928) (“[O]ne merchant
shall not divert customers from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the
second. This has been, and perhaps even more now is, the whole Law and the Prophets on the
subject, though it assumes many guises.”).
121. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004)
(“[S]ome possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use.”); see infra notes
179–91 and accompanying text (discussing KP Permanent and the section 33(b)(4) defense).
122. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222–23 (3d
Cir. 2005) (“[N]either classic or nominative fair use should rise and fall based on a finding of
likelihood of confusion.”); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 WL 464688, at *6–
8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (“[The nominative fair use test] assumes a likelihood of confusion,
[but] provides an opportunity to determine whether the defendant’s use of the mark infringes
or can be defended as ‘fair use.’”).
123. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1012 (C.D.
Cal. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-56237 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006). It may be a comment on this
controversial video game that the plaintiff apparently worried its strip club would be harmed if
consumers erroneously believed it sponsored or endorsed Grand Theft Auto. (Perhaps more
plausibly, the plaintiff may have hoped for some licensing fees from the highly successful video
game.)
124. In addition to the similar name, the fictional club’s logo, signage, and awning have
some resemblance to the actual club. Id. at 1020.
125. Id. at 1017, 1041 (“Los Santos mimics the look and feel of actual Los Angeles
locations,” though is altered somewhat to fit with the game’s “irreverent tone.”).
126. Id. at 1048.
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expert testimony that made a decent showing of likelihood of confusion—
probably enough to survive summary judgment and to support a jury verdict
if likelihood of confusion were the only valid consideration.127 Continual
growth of licensed product placement in movies, video games, and other
media—and increased consumer awareness of it—will exacerbate this
problem by fueling the cyclical feedback loop discussed earlier.128
Enslavement to confusion avoidance is often responsible when courts
rule against expressive uses. For instance, in one famous (or perhaps
infamous) 1994 case, the Eighth Circuit found a humor magazine liable for
using MICHELOB marks in a parody advertisement purportedly selling
“MICHELOB Oily”.129 The obvious parody even included an image of the
iconic Anheuser-Busch eagle covered in oil and yelling “Yuck!” The
appellate court’s finding for the plaintiff turned in large part on the
“distinct possibility, accepted by the district court, ‘that a superficial observer
might believe that the ad parody was approved by Anheuser-Busch.’”130 The
appellate court found that the circuit’s multifactor likelihood of confusion
test favored the plaintiff131 and scolded the district court because it had
“skewed its likelihood of confusion analysis in an attempt to give ‘special
127. Id. at 1045–47. The district court expressed skepticism about the survey in dicta. Id. at
1046. Compared to other cases that do find likelihood of confusion, however, the survey
certainly could have been enough to defeat summary judgment had the court considered it
without reference to the First Amendment issues.
128. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text; Gibson, supra note 7, at 917–20
(discussing “trademark’s doctrinal feedback in the film and television industry”); Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized
Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 889 (2005) (analyzing expressive uses of
trademarks in films). Product placement in video games has a long history but is now poised for
explosive growth. See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 960–62 (describing, in 1993, the Cool Spot video
game that was authorized by makers of 7-UP soda and used 7-UP trademarks pervasively); Frank
Rose, Blind Spots, WIRED, Aug. 2007, at 144–45 (reporting an estimate by the Yankee Group that
the annual advertising market in video games will grow from $56 million in 2005 to $732
million in 2010); Posting of Lee Glendinning to Guardian DeadlineUSA Blog, Obama’s New
Advertising Pitch: Video Games, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/deadlineusa/2008/
oct/15/uselections2008-barackobama (Oct. 15, 2008, 11:13 BST) (describing President-elect
Barack Obama’s purchase of campaign advertisements in eighteen video games, including
Guitar Hero and Madden NFL 09). Not surprisingly, trademark litigation involving video games
has increased recently as well. See, e.g., Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 884,
886 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Ultimate Creations, Inc. v. THQ, Inc., No. CV-05-1134-PHX-SMM, 2008
WL 215827, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2008); E.S.S. Entm’t, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
129. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
130. Id. at 775 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 814 F. Supp. 791, 797
(E.D. Mo. 1993)).
131. Id. Having found confusion, the appellate court then claimed to turn to a separate
analysis of whether First Amendment considerations might counterbalance this confusion, id. at
775–76, but in reality, this discussion simply rehashed its earlier discussion of the intent factor
under the multifactor confusion test. The court faulted the defendant’s failure to take more
steps to dispel potential confusion. Id. at 776. Because there was confusion, the court reasoned,
the parody must have failed. Id. at 776–77. This is in line with Judge Leval’s suggestion that a
successful parody, by definition, is not confusing. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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sensitivity’ to the First Amendment.”132 If the recent Grand Theft Auto court
had followed the reasoning of the older MICHELOB Oily case, it likely
would have come out the other way.
This notion of permitting some confusion in the interest of protecting
speech should not seem strange. First Amendment doctrines outside of
trademark law often exhibit similar tolerance of potentially misleading, false,
and even borderline threatening speech in order to protect free expression.
When public figures claim defamation or intentional infliction of emotional
distress, for instance, they must prove greatly heightened levels of culpability
in order to recover damages, precisely because an “erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the breathing space that they need to survive.”133 The
structure of this “actual malice” doctrine permits some misleading
statements to enter public debate without legal penalty—and indeed expects
it to happen—as a reasonable price to ensure that other statements are not
suppressed.134 Similarly, the Supreme Court rejects seemingly legitimate
interests in preventing fraud or libel as justifications for curtailment of the
right of anonymous speech.135 The true threats doctrine even allows
passionate advocacy of violence, provided it does not spill over into direct
provocation of imminent lawlessness.136 In all these instances, the law
tolerates a great deal in order to yield as wide a berth for speech as
reasonably possible. The values underlying these venerable decisions are
equally present in many expressive use cases, and trademark law ought to
reflect that balance.
In sum, marching one-by-one through the ill-fitting factors of the
likelihood of confusion test is a terrible methodology for resolving
expressive use cases. It is unclear. It gives little weight to other important
values such as free expression. And, it does require an enormous amount of
time to develop complex facts, to argue the numerous different
interpretations of those facts, to deploy experts and empirical research to

132. Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 773.
133. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)) (defamation claim); see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–
53 (1988) (applying the same justification to an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress
claim); cf. Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007)
(“[A]nti-dilution laws should be interpreted to provide breathing room for First Amendment
concerns.”).
134. Indeed, if the Nazi comparison in Charles Smith’s graphics had been to Wal-Mart
founder Sam Walton instead of to his company, it likely would have been an easy case in Smith’s
favor.
135. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349–51 (1995) (concluding the
state’s interest in preventing fraud in election campaigns is not sufficient to justify infringing
upon the right to anonymous speech).
136. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927–28 (1982); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam).
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buttress those interpretations, and to get to the point in complex litigation
(typically after the close of all discovery) when these issues are ripe for
decision.
Courts increasingly understand the inadequacy of the likelihood of
confusion metric. This is precisely the reason why the substantive results in
cases involving expressive uses have become so much more protective of
speech. However, the courts have not yet moved from this realization to the
development of a coherent trademark fair use doctrine that avoids the
structural problems in the likelihood of confusion test.
IV. EXISTING DOCTRINES
This Part critiques five doctrines—both affirmative defenses and
alternatives to the likelihood of confusion test—that defendants and courts
have used in an attempt to evaluate expressive uses with greater sensitivity to
free speech interests.137 All of them suffer from the same problems of
uncertainty and delay we have seen already. All effectively reduce, in whole
or in part, into slight variations of the likelihood of confusion analysis,
returning obliquely to the very same problems discussed in Part III. None is
sufficient to control the chilling effect.
A. TRADEMARK USE THEORY
If any debate in the sedate world of legal academia can be called “hot,”
then a recent exchange of views concerning the doctrine of “trademark use”
might qualify.138 Several commentators have advanced a set of similar
arguments that trademark liability requires a threshold determination about
the nature of a defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark—that it is sufficiently
commercial, that it is linked to source-identifying purposes, or both.139 In
addition to these commentators, some recent judicial decisions appear to
have relied on some species of a trademark use requirement.140 Other
137. The Lanham Act’s cybersquatting provision also includes a type of meta-fair use
exemption: it forecloses liability (by negating the bad faith element) “in any case in which the
court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use
of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
Because this Article does not cover domain names as expressive uses, see supra notes 23–25 and
accompanying text, it sets aside that provision.
138. See Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, supra note 7, at 1670 (“The debate over trademark use
has become a hot-button issue in intellectual property (“IP”) law.”); McKenna, Trademark Use,
supra note 85, at 2 (“‘Trademark use’ is all the rage.”).
139. See generally, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark
Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006); Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, supra note 7; Dogan &
Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 16; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use
Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 541 (2008);
Goldman, Deregulating, supra note 25, at 593–96; Goldman, Online, supra note 80, at 414–24; Uli
Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (2004).
140. See generally, e.g., Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir.
2007); Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005); DaimlerChrysler AG v.
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scholars responded with skepticism about the doctrinal existence of this
requirement, its usefulness, or both.141 The Iowa Law Review recently
published an exchange of views between some of the important scholars on
both sides of the trademark use issue.142
Certain elements of this debate are tangential to our purposes here and
can be set aside. First, while supporters of a trademark use requirement offer
it as an antidote to the chilling effect on expressive uses,143 much discussion
of this approach concentrates on concerns about the sorts of online-specific
trademark uses that lie beyond the scope of this Article.144 Second, we can
pass over the question of whether the trademark use requirement exists
under current law at all. The answer depends on competing interpretations
of ambiguous language in the Lanham Act145 and dueling accounts of the
rationales embodied in early trademark decisions.146 Because we are starting
from scratch and pursuing the prescriptive question of how we ought to
design a fair use doctrine, however, we need not delve into the history.147
We can assume that a trademark use requirement is or could be applied to
expressive use cases, and instead ask: would that be a good idea?

Bloom, 315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619
(6th Cir. 1996); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); U-Haul
Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003).
141. See generally, e.g., William G. Barber, Dumping the “Designation of Source” Requirement from
the TDRA: A Response to the Alleged “Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases,” 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 559 (2008); Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 25;
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1703 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Janis, Lessons]; Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK.
L. REV. 1327, 1394–98 (2008); McKenna, Trademark Use, supra note 85, at 53–73.
142. See generally Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 25; Dinwoodie & Janis,
Lessons, supra note 141; Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, supra note 7.
143. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 139, at 405; Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 16, at
809–11; Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, supra note 7, at 1675–82; cf. Lemley, supra note 2, at 1710–
13 (expressing concern about suppression of expressive uses from expansion of trademark law).
144. See supra Part II.A (defining “expressive uses”); see, e.g., Barrett, supra note 139, at 395–
450; Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 16, at 801–37; Lastowka, supra note 141, at 1394–
98; see also Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment: Searching for
Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 976 (2007) [hereinafter Domain Names] (applying
trademark use concepts to domain name disputes). Dogan and Lemley also view trademark use
limits as a bulwark against unreasonable expansion of secondary liability to intermediaries who
arguably do not “use” the mark at all. See Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 16, at 812–31.
Again, this is a very important topic, but it is not the subject of this Article.
145. Compare Barrett, supra note 139, at 382–87, and Widmaier, supra note 139, at 618–21,
with 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 23:11.50, Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 25, at
1609–16, and McKenna, Trademark Use, supra note 85, at 24–53.
146. Compare Barrett, supra note 139, at 379–81, 389–93, and Widmaier, supra note 139, at
613–18, with Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 25, at 1616–21, and McKenna,
Trademark Use, supra note 85, at 8–24.
147. See Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, supra note 7, at 1690 (“Even if trademark use were not
well grounded in history, that would be no reason for courts to hold back from adopting the
doctrine now.”).
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The premise of the trademark use doctrine is the notion that only a
defendant’s use of a mark as a mark gives rise to liability. At first glance, this
appears to be an appealing means to handle expressive use cases. Its
advocates view the longstanding existence of a trademark use limitation,
integrated into the structure of trademark law, as one of the gravitational
forces that once prevented encroachment on expressive uses.148 Advocates
also argue that the analysis of the trademark use requirement would occur at
the outset of a case, before engagement with most other defenses and
certainly before any consideration of likelihood of confusion. As Stacey
Dogan and Mark Lemley state this hope, “[T]he trademark use requirement
serves a gatekeeper function, limiting the reach of trademark law without
regard to a factual inquiry into consumer confusion.”149 If it worked, such a
gatekeeper would avoid the muddled standards and delays that contribute
so much to the prelitigation chilling effect.
Unfortunately, on closer examination this appealing vision of
trademark use reveals itself as a mirage. The ultimate question posed by the
trademark use doctrine asks if a particular use invites an interpretation as a
source identifier. The most straightforward basis to determine whether an
expressive use carries source-identifying significance is to ask whether those
who come into contact with it perceive it that way. This question restates the
fundamental inquiry of trademark law—and it does so with less guidance
from surrounding context or doctrine.
Existing trademark doctrines almost always define marks by reference to
this consumer-based vantage point.150 Mark McKenna, who thinks that a
trademark use requirement exists in current law, nevertheless concludes that
it does almost no good: “[B]ecause trademark use can be determined only
from the perspective of consumers, it cannot serve as a threshold
requirement separable from likelihood of confusion inquiry.”151 In other
words, a trademark is used “as a mark” if consumers perceive that use as
indicating “the affiliation, connection, or association of [the defendant]
with another person, or . . . the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.”152 An approach
to defining trademark use grounded in consumer understanding collapses

148. See Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 16, at 782–83.
149. Id. at 805; see Widmaier, supra note 139, at 621–24 (suggesting sequential analysis of
trademark cases that would consider trademark use doctrine before other issues).
150. See McKenna, Trademark Use, supra note 85, at 54 (arguing that, except for the
functionality doctrine, every distinction relevant to trademark protectability depends on
consumer understanding).
151. Id. at 57.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
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completely into a slightly different way of asking the crucial likelihood of
confusion question.153
In principle, courts could conceivably judge trademark use from a
perspective other than that of the consumer, but the alternatives do not
improve the utility of the doctrine in expressive use cases. One could judge
liability based on the defendant’s perspective—the intent to cause
confusion. This understanding of the doctrine would cause several
problems, and there is no indication that trademark use advocates would
support it.154 Evidentiary issues arising from such an approach probably
would destroy any early “gatekeeper” character of the doctrine. More
fundamentally, this interpretation would narrow trademark law
unacceptably to cover only uses that purposefully confuse consumers. There is
no such intent requirement in the Lanham Act.155 Trade dress
infringement, for example, may result from the coincidental selection of
packaging elements that nonetheless mislead consumers into mistaking the
defendant’s product for the plaintiff’s.
If the trademark use determination does not turn on the subjective
perception of the consumer or of the defendant, perhaps it could still be
based on some objective standard of what uses constitute branding or
advertising.156 Trademark law has embraced specific linkages to particular
marketing practices in the past. At one time, the narrow interpretation of
the affixation requirement meant that advertising did not constitute use of a
mark for purposes of establishing rights. Some scholars have suggested
developing or reinstating such distinctions today, such as a proposal that
advertising slogans should be outside the scope of trademark law.157
However, the consistent contrary trend toward liberalizing those

153. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 25, at 1645 (“[M]any cases nominally
decided on the basis of use dissolve into analyses suspiciously similar to those of other doctrines
such as distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion. So employed, use functions principally as a
proxy. It makes no autonomous analytical contribution.”); McKenna, Trademark Use, supra note
85, at 57–58 (showing the overlap of the consumer-focused trademark use doctrine with
likelihood of confusion analysis).
154. Barrett explicitly argues the converse—that even a proven intent to divert customers is
not an indicator of trademark use. Barrett, supra note 139, at 389–93.
155. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if
we . . . concluded that Disney was as innocent as a fawn with no intent to copy or appropriate
GoTo’s logo, it would prove nothing since no such intent is necessary . . . .”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22 cmt. b (1995) (“[P]roof of an intent to deceive is not
required . . . .”). But cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C.
L. REV. 737, 754–55 (2007) (suggesting that trademark law departs from other legal speech
restrictions in its lack-of-intent-requirements).
156. This may be Margreth Barrett’s view. See Barrett, supra note 139, at 385–87 (putting
expansion of trademark protection in context of affixation and “use in commerce”
requirements).
157. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 189, 261–63 (2006).
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requirements better reflects the regulatory role of trademark law in
overseeing modern marketing practices. Marks now encompass anything
that identifies source.158 Resort to an objective standard for whether a use is
undertaken “in a way that allows consumers to rely on the mark”159 would
freeze certain methods of signifying source as the only ones that can be
protected. Such an approach would render trademark law inflexible and
timebound, adapting poorly to this era of rapid innovation in consumer
marketing.160
In response to this type of criticism, Dogan and Lemley acknowledge
that “definitional problems” mean the trademark use doctrine may have
“limited value in close cases.”161 They further argue that even if the
trademark use doctrine cannot “play a role in all cases,” it still has value as a
“limited tool for identifying classes of behavior that cannot constitute
infringement.”162 Of course they are correct that some cases can be
identified where the use in question is so far from use “as a mark” that this
doctrine’s indeterminacy could be reduced or eliminated. For example, one
recent case involved the use of plaintiff UCSY’s corporate name to label an
online discussion board about the performance of UCSY stock.163 The First
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim—
the earliest possible disposition—reasoning in part that the defendant was
“not using the ‘UCSY’ trade name ‘on’ a product (or business) at all, but
[was] simply referring to the existing company that has adopted that trade
name.”164 While trademark use served as a convenient justification for
disposing of the claim quickly, however, the court clearly considered the
case almost frivolous and noted that other doctrinal approaches might have
worked equally well to reach the same result.165

158. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (“[T]rademark law”
prohibits defendants from “copying a source-identifying mark.”); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (finding a trademark to be “any word, name, symbol, or
device” which makes a good distinct (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000)).
159. Barrett, supra note 139, at 395.
160. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 25, at 1664 (“A more refined solution
would preserve the flexibility of the standards-based approach while developing mechanisms to
hedge against its uncertainties in particularly sensitive cases.”); Lastowka, supra note 141, at
1396–98 (suggesting, in the search engine context, that employing a broad trademark use
requirement to exclude entire classes of uses would abdicate too much legal power that might
be important in preventing potentially harmful uses of trademarks).
161. Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, supra note 7, at 1674.
162. Id.
163. Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007).
164. Id. at 425.
165. The court also referred to the nominative use doctrine, see infra Part IV.C, and First
Amendment considerations, see infra Part IV.D, and concluded:
Whether [defendant] Lycos’s use of the “UCSY” trade name is viewed as a
noncommercial use, as a nominative use, or in some other way, we hold that using
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A doctrine that decides only easy cases will not suffice as a trademark
fair use doctrine. The intuitions behind the trademark use argument prove
illuminating when rethinking trademark fair use. Certainly, they may help in
developing the correct approach to other important issues, such as search
engine liability or metatag infringement. But trademark use theory itself is
not the doctrinal mechanism we seek to protect a broad range of fair uses at
issue in this Article.
B. DESCRIPTIVE OR “CLASSIC” FAIR USE UNDER SECTION 33(B)(4)
Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act166 provides an affirmative defense
for uses of trademarked language or imagery to describe the attributes of
the defendant’s product. The statutory language applies to “a use, otherwise
than as a mark . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly
and in good faith only to describe the [defendant’s] goods or services.”167
The Seventh Circuit reorganizes the confusing language of section 33(b)(4)
into three clearer elements: (1) nontrademark use; (2) descriptiveness; and
(3) fairness and good faith.168
In general, descriptive terminology or imagery cannot gain trademark
protection unless it also carries “secondary meaning” as a distinctive
identifier of source.169 Even if a trademark covers this specialized sense of a
word or image, its underlying primary meaning remains in the public
domain. The section 33(b)(4) defense works in tandem with this and other
provisions of trademark law to ensure that trademark protection does not
interfere with the ability to use everyday language. Without such limitations,
markholders could gain an unfair advantage by preventing competitors from
describing their products adequately, and the public would lose valuable
information that reduces search costs.170
a company’s trade name to label a message board on which the company is
discussed is not a use covered by the Florida anti-dilution statute.
Universal Commc’ns Sys., 478 F.3d at 425.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
167. Id. The defense is sometimes referred to as “descriptive fair use” and, especially in the
Ninth Circuit, as “classic fair use.” This Article uses both phrases but usually refers to it by its
citation in section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act.
168. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992)
(describing the three elements). Fairness and good faith could be listed as separate elements,
although it is not clear how they differ. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004) (naming fairness and good faith as separate elements but
handling them in a similar fashion).
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(b) (1993); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e)(1), (f) (2000) (requiring secondary meaning for federal registration of descriptive
marks); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1976)
(explaining the difference between marks that are generic, merely descriptive, and descriptive
with secondary meaning).
170. See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058–59 (7th Cir.
1995); U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Admittedly, the free speech interests protected by typical section
33(b)(4) cases may be less profound than in cases involving core political
speech or artistic commentary. For example, one leading case concerns a
suit by the makers of the sugary pastel-colored “SweeTART” candy against
Ocean Spray Cranberries over newspaper and television advertisements
featuring various punning descriptions of cranberry juice as “sweet-tart.”171
Another defendant invoked the section 33(b)(4) defense against a plaintiff
who held the mark FISH-FRI on a batter mix for breading fish before frying
it.172 There, the court found the defendant’s descriptive use of the term “fish
fry” to describe its similar product was fair use.173 Likewise, the producers of
those ubiquitous cardboard air fresheners shaped like pine trees that hang
from cars’ rear-view mirrors lost their suit against the makers of Christmasthemed and pine-scented room air fresheners that also looked like
Christmas trees.174 The court found section 33(b)(4) applied because the
pine tree image connoted both the seasonal and olfactory qualities of the
defendant’s product.175
While perhaps quotidian, these disputes nonetheless involve uses of
marks to articulate ideas unrelated to source identification.176 They are,
therefore, expressive uses as defined above.177 At times, courts also turn to
section 33(b)(4) in cases with greater speech interests at stake. For example,
section 33(b)(4) was the basis for protecting products depicting the JOY OF
SIX newspaper headline.178
Structural problems of three kinds reduce the efficacy of the section
33(b)(4) defense as a protection for fair use. First, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court’s recent command that a likelihood of confusion finding
does not foreclose this defense, it appears that at least some courts still
require the completion of the confusion analysis before turning to section
33(b)(4). Second, the statutory elements of the defense require factintensive examination of issues that greatly resemble confusion
considerations and, in any event, further reduce the prospects for early
adjudication. Finally, different circuits interpret the defense either very
narrowly or very broadly, depending on the tradition embodied in their
precedent.
171. Sunmark, 64 F.3d at 1055–56.
172. Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
173. Id. at 796.
174. Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 1995).
175. Id. at 267–70.
176. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992)
(noting that section 33(b)(4) embodies the “principle that no one should be able to
appropriate descriptive language through trademark registration”).
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 639 (7th Cir. 2001); see also M.B.H.
Enters., Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 52 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding section 33(b)(4) fair use
for a radio station slogan).
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First, in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., the
Supreme Court explicitly held that a defendant need not disprove
likelihood of confusion to benefit from the section 33(b)(4) defense.179
Until the Supreme Court intervened, the Ninth Circuit had consistently held
that a finding of likely consumer confusion foreclosed the section 33(b)(4)
defense.180 Some language in cases from other circuits may have echoed the
Ninth Circuit’s position.181 Other circuits had rejected it definitively.182 But
the Ninth Circuit’s position was untenable because the plaintiff has the
burden to prove consumer confusion. In the words of the Fourth Circuit,
“[A] defense which can be considered only when the prima facie case has
failed is no defense at all.”183 The Supreme Court agreed unanimously,
stating that “it would make no sense to give the defendant a defense of
showing affirmatively that the plaintiff cannot succeed in proving some
element. A defendant has no need of a court’s true belief when agnosticism
will do.”184
The Court declined, however, to say any more about what role
likelihood of confusion should play in the analysis.185 Rather, KP Permanent
left lower courts the job of recalibrating the balance between source

179. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004).
180. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that “a fair use may not be a confusing use”); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impressions I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding likely consumer
confusion precludes fair use); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)
(same); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
181. See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003);
Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983). Arguably the
cited statements were dicta. In any event, these circuits did not have the same clearly stated and
often-repeated rule as did the Ninth Circuit.
182. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30–
31 (2d Cir. 1997); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir.
1997); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995).
183. Shakespeare Co., 110 F.3d at 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t defies logic to argue that a
defense may not be asserted in the only situation where it even becomes relevant.”).
184. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 118–20.
185. Id. at 123. The Court states:
[W]e think it would be improvident to go further in this case . . . . It suffices to
realize that our holding that fair use can occur along with some degree of
confusion does not foreclose the relevance of the extent of any likely consumer
confusion in assessing whether a defendant’s use is objectively fair.
Id.; see Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of
Reversal, KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004) (No.
03-409), 2004 WL 832071, at *13–18 (“[A] substantial likelihood of consumer confusion about
the source of the goods in question may undermine the statutory elements of a fair use
defense.”) The author of this Article was a co-author of this amicus brief. See also David W.
Barnes & Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use of Trademarks: Confusion About Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 833, 848–62 (2004) (recommending a balancing approach in
cases under section 33(b)(4)).
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identification and expression. This reservation may have undermined the
case’s holding.186 On remand, the Ninth Circuit essentially reinstated, for all
practical purposes, its requirement that likelihood of confusion be disproved
entirely before a descriptive use can prevail under section 33(b)(4).187 After
extensive quotation from the Supreme Court decision, the Ninth Circuit
again reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the
defendant on section 33(b)(4) grounds because disputes of material fact
remained.188 The very first such factual issue the court listed was “the degree
of likely confusion.”189 The appeals court ordered analysis of the multifactor
Sleekcraft test to evaluate this factual issue.190 Thus, while obeying the precise
mandate from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit still holds the section
33(b)(4) defense hostage to a lengthy and complex analysis of likelihood of
confusion rather than intervening to screen out eligible uses early in
litigation. 191
Second, even if formally separated from likelihood of confusion
analysis, section 33(b)(4) itself remains an elliptical standard that can
require lengthy, fact-intensive analysis. The requirement of use “otherwise
than as a mark”192 veers into the same definitional problems we have already
seen with trademark use theory.193 The language aims to separate a
trademark’s primary meaning from its secondary meaning, but says nothing
about how to locate this boundary. If secondary meaning is defined simply as
whatever the public associates with source, then nontrademark use becomes
identical to an absence of likelihood of confusion. Similarly, a few courts see
the descriptiveness element as the mirror image of nontrademark use: a use
can be descriptive only if it is not source-identifying.194

186. See Austin, supra note 16, at 182–89 (criticizing KP Permanent).
187. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 607–09
(9th Cir. 2005).
188. Id. at 607.
189. Id. at 609.
190. Id. at 608 (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979)).
191. In contrast to this approach, the Second Circuit has long held likelihood of confusion
essentially irrelevant in judging section 33(b)(4), and it seems unlikely to alter this position
after KP Permanent, which allowed, but did not require, consideration of confusion. See Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1999); Cosmetically
Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Cheesbrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
193. See supra Part IV.A.
194. See, e.g., Whirlpool Props. v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-414, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30311, at *65–66 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2005) (“The first issue is whether defendant used
the term descriptively and not as a trademark. There questions are really two sides of the same
coin.”).
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Even the good faith requirement of section 33(b)(4) leads to these
problems. Intent is a famously fact-intensive question.195 A defendant can
best show good faith by, for example, using its own source-identifying mark
in conjunction with the descriptive use, or avoiding other resemblances to a
plaintiff’s products, such as trade dress.196 A likelihood of confusion analysis
usually encompasses very similar factual considerations because intent is one
of the elements of the multifactor test in most circuits.197 At least two district
court decisions after KP Permanent explicitly tied the good faith element of
section 33(b)(4) to the intent factor under likelihood of confusion
analysis—and found both inappropriate for summary judgment.198
If these interpretations of the section 33(b)(4) elements prevail, they
threaten to toss the defense right back into the likelihood of confusion
maelstrom. Just as before KP Permanent, defendants could invoke section
33(b)(4) only after they had effectively won the case already. More
generally, these elements necessitate a lengthy and uncertain evaluation of
the defendant’s expressive use. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the KP
Permanent remand again provided the worst-case scenario for a quick and
clear section 33(b)(4) analysis:
Among the relevant factors for consideration by the jury in
determining the fairness of the use are the degree of likely confusion,
the strength of the trademark, the descriptive nature of the term
for the product or service being offered by KP [the party invoking
the defense] and the availability of alternative descriptive terms,
the extent of the use of the term prior to the registrations of the

195. See, e.g., Kerr Corp. v. Freeman Mfg. & Supply Co., No. 1:05CV0621, 2007 WL
2344752, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2007) (finding summary judgment inappropriate on a
section 33(b)(4) defense because intent issues required jury resolution).
196. See, e.g., Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Cheesbrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28,
30–31 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant’s use of its house marks bolstered a good
faith argument); Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir.
1983) (holding that the defendant’s conscious decision to choose different trade dress than
plaintiff used in conjunction with FISH-FRI supported good faith required for
section 33(b)(4)); M.B.H. Enters., Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 54–56 (7th Cir. 1980) (same
on house marks); Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 463 F. Supp. 2d 127, 137
(D. Mass. 2006) (same on house marks in preliminary injunction case).
197. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
28, § 23:119 (“If the defendant’s mark or product appearance is very close to plaintiff’s, a court
will state that the defendant ‘must have’ intended to deceive and confuse consumers because
the marks are so similar.”). McCarthy also notes that courts often infer a likelihood of confusion
from an intent to confuse. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 23:110. So, courts infer intent from
confusion, and confusion from intent.
198. See Kerr Corp., 2007 WL 2344752, at *10 (“This question [of good faith] is closely tied
to the ‘intent of defendant’ factor and requires a jury for its resolution, so summary judgment is
not appropriate.”); Whirlpool Props., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30311, at *67–72.
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trademark, and any differences among the times and contexts in
which KP has used the term.199
This formulation of fairness must assume that the factfinder has already
decided likelihood of confusion. It also includes enough highly factual issues
to make summary judgment nearly impossible.
The third shortcoming of the section 33(b)(4) defense is its unclear
breadth. The statutory language suggests that a party can rely on this
immunity “only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their
geographic origin.”200 Some of the cases, such as the FISH-FRI and
SweeTART examples noted above, matched this condition perfectly. The use
of the pine tree shape to “describe” an air-freshener’s pine scent and
Christmas theme requires more interpretive creativity to fit within section
33(b)(4), but the court was persuasive that it did.201
In other situations, especially in the Ninth Circuit, courts twist
themselves into knots determining whether the defendant’s use constituted
a self-description at all rather than a description aimed at the plaintiff (and
therefore covered by the nominative use doctrine instead). These courts
limit section 33(b)(4) strictly to cases “where the defendant has used the
plaintiff’s mark only to describe his own product, and not at all to describe
the plaintiff’s product.”202 As explained further below,203 because it can be
difficult to tell when this is so, courts applying this rule often find they must
analyze a case both ways.
Other courts go in the opposite direction. They give a very loose
reading to the statutory language allowing the defense “only to describe the
goods or services of such party.”204 Consider this explanation of the
necessary “descriptiveness” in the JOY OF SIX case:
The defendants used “The joy of six” as a headline to describe a
newsworthy event and the happiness associated with the Bulls’ sixth
NBA championship. This use did not change with the reproduction
of the Tribune’s front page onto championship memorabilia. As
Ms. Packman [the plaintiff] herself admitted, “the joy of six” is a
phrase commonly used to describe the emotions associated with six
of anything. Ms. Packman cannot appropriate the phrase to herself
and thereby prevent others from using the phrase in a descriptive
sense, as defendants did here.205

199. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir.
2005) (emphasis added).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
201. Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995).
202. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150–52 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
203. See infra notes 238–47 and accompanying text.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
205. Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 641 (7th Cir. 2001).
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The Seventh Circuit, expressing understandable concern that the plaintiff
should not control descriptive and expressive language, turns section
33(b)(4) into a defense for any description, regardless of its connection to
the defendant’s product. Other courts have done the same, also relying on
the “use in a descriptive sense” formulation.206
These inconsistent readings of section 33(b)(4) make it difficult to tell
in advance whether the defense will be available at all, especially if it is
unclear in which circuit an eventual lawsuit might be brought.207 Under the
narrower interpretation, the Tribune’s JOY OF SIX merchandise would not
qualify for section 33(b)(4) protection. Under the broader view, depiction
of features of the PLAY PEN mark in Grand Theft Auto could well be decided
under section 33(b)(4) because the video game used that depiction to help
describe a gritty neighborhood similar to East Los Angeles.208
Even the most sweeping view of section 33(b)(4) as applicable to any
description would omit many expressive uses (for instance, the AFLAC
case). Thus it would never be sufficient as the only safeguard for trademark
fair use. In a less ambitious supporting role as one of several possible fair use
defenses, however, section 33(b)(4) still falls short. Its entanglement in
likelihood of confusion analysis and other time-consuming and fact-intensive
inquiries limit its potential as an early screening mechanism for defendants
to avoid costly and lengthy litigation. The uncertainty about its scope adds to
the problem. Most defendants looking for a clear-cut and relatively quick
judicial assessment of the legality of an expressive use must continue their
search.
C. NOMINATIVE FAIR USE
Judge Alex Kozinski formulated a special test for “nominative fair use”
in the well-known 1992 case of New Kids on the Block v. News America
Publishing, Inc.209 The test has since become a staple in Ninth Circuit cases

206. For example, Cosmetically Sealed Industries, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d
28 (2d Cir. 1997) states:
Though the terms of the Act recognize the fair use defense where the
name or term is used “to describe the goods,” that phrase has not
been narrowly confined to words that describe a characteristic of the
goods, such as size or quality. Instead, we have recognized that the
phrase permits use of words or images that are used, in Judge Leval’s
helpful expression, in their “descriptive sense.”
Id. at 30 (citing Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir.
1995)).
207. McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1214.
208. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1041 (C.D.
Cal. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-56237 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006). In the actual case, decided
under the Ninth Circuit’s more restrictive view of section 33(b)(4), the defendants did not even
advance the defense. Id. at 1029.
209. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
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involving expressive uses. The Third and Fifth Circuits, and some district
courts, also have deployed various forms of nominative fair use doctrine.210
The First and Sixth Circuits, in contrast, explicitly declined opportunities to
adopt the test.211 Although New Kids itself engaged in common-sense analysis
of the situation before it, the test created there has not fared as well. Courts
following in the footsteps of New Kids sowed confusion and seriously
deformed the original proposal. Nominative fair use as it now exists has
become ungainly and often unhelpful.
New Kids involved a suit by the enormously successful teen pop band212
against USA Today and the weekly tabloid Star. The two publications had run
unscientific polls inviting readers to call “900” telephone numbers to opine
on the relative merits of the band members.213 Judge Kozinski, writing for
the court, emphasized that there was no reasonable way for the publications
to describe the nature of their polls without using the band’s trademarked
name.214 “Indeed,” said the court, “it is often virtually impossible to refer to
a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of
reference or any other such purpose without using the mark.”215 The
analysis drew on older cases involving somewhat similar situations.216

210. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005)
(adopting a form of the nominative fair use doctrine); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155
F.3d 526, 545–47 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); see, e.g., Frontrange Solutions USA, Inc. v. Newroad
Software, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 821, 834–35 (D. Colo. 2007) (same); S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl.
Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (same); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Camp Sys. Int’l, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1381–82 (S.D. Ga. 2006) (same); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns
Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 WL 464688, at *5–7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (same); Merck &
Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc., No. 99 C 1174, 2001 WL 747422, at *5–
6 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 29, 2001) (same).
211. See Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007)
(finding “no occasion” to adopt the test); PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243,
256 (6th Cir. 2003) (“We are not inclined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s analysis here.”). But see
Romantics v. Activision Pub., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (appearing to
rely, despite contrary Sixth Circuit precedent, on New Kids nominative use test as alternate
grounds for protecting expressive use); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sharon Woods
Collision Ctr., Inc., No. 1:07cv 457, 2007 WL 4207158, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2007) (same).
212. Stephen Thomas Erlewine & Andrew Leahey, New Kids on the Block: Biography,
Allmusic.com,
http://www.allmusic.com/cg/amg.dll?p=amg&sql=11:jifqxqr5ld6e~T1
(last
visited Sept. 16, 2008) (“[T]he band had a seemingly endless streak of hits in 1988 and 1989.
[E]ven the group’s Christmas album went double platinum . . . .”).
213. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 304. Questions included: “Which of the five is your fave? Or are
they a turn-off?” and “Now which kid is the sexiest?” Id. The polls were not a great success,
raising less than $1900 between them. Id. at 304 n.1.
214. Id. at 308 (“Indeed, how could someone not conversant with the proper names of the
individual New Kids talk about the group at all?”).
215. Id. at 306.
216. Id. at 307 (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.
1969) (denying Volkswagen’s claim against an auto repair shop that specialized in fixing
Volkswagens and told the public of its expertise by using VW trademarks); WCVB-TV v. Boston
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Coining a phrase, the New Kids opinion reinterpreted such situations as
“nominative uses” and propounded a novel three-prong test to resolve these
disputes:
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to
identify the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.217
The New Kids court found all three requirements satisfied in the case at
bar. The first prong of “necessity” simply restates the threshold for defining
nominative use—the polls could not ask their questions without using the
NEW KIDS mark.218 As to the amount of the mark used, the polls did not
include “the New Kids’ distinctive logo or anything else that isn’t needed to
make the announcements intelligible to readers.”219 Finally, the court found
nothing suggesting that the New Kids had sponsored the polls, and noted
that USA Today even allowed respondents to declare all the band members
“a turn off,” thus indicating “quite the contrary.”220
New Kids obviously reached the correct result: it would be preposterous
if famous musicians could prevent magazines from discussing them, and a
reader poll is little different from an unauthorized biography or parody.221
Any other outcome could thwart both communication and competition.222
When we evaluate the means of the nominative use doctrine as opposed
to the ends, however, the picture becomes much cloudier in at least three
respects. First, most courts following New Kids have not analyzed nominative
fair use as an early defense, making it much less effective in delivering clear
and swift resolutions that reduce chilling effects on speech. Second, as
mentioned previously, some courts have become entangled in a foolish
preliminary inquiry of asking whether the nominative fair use doctrine,
rather than section 33(b)(4), applies to particular facts. The third and most

Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer, J.) (denying injunctive relief to Boston
Marathon organizers who sued a television station that used the race’s trademarked name in
identifying its unlicensed coverage of the event); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1968) (denying claim by makers of Chanel perfume against a company selling an imitation
fragrance for using the CHANEL trademark to promote its (lawful) knockoff product)).
217. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 308–09.
221. Id. at 309 & n.9.
222. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309 (“[T]he trademark laws do not give the New Kids the
right to channel their fans’ enthusiasm (and dollars) only into items licensed or authorized by
them.” (citing Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir.
1990))).
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significant problem, just as with section 33(b)(4), is the collapse of the
requirements for nominative fair use into a substitute likelihood of
confusion analysis in a way that actually prejudices fair uses and further
prolongs litigation.
First, courts postpone nominative fair use arguments until very late in
the litigation. It is not clear from the New Kids opinion itself exactly when a
court should consider the doctrine. The opinion called nominative fair use a
“defense,” suggesting it should operate as an affirmative defense to
liability.223 At least one early case saw it as merely a species of the section
33(b)(4) defense.224 Some scholars understandably view New Kids as
embracing a variation of trademark use theory because the opinion refers to
a nominative use as “a non-trademark use of a mark—a use to which the
[trademark] infringement laws simply do not apply.”225 Other observers
strenuously oppose this reading.226 In a speech two years after issuing New
Kids, Judge Kozinski himself suggested—without commenting on New Kids in
particular—that he may have favored something else entirely: that
trademark law would “evolve” new approaches targeted to particular factual
situations involving expressive uses.227
Subsequent cases render this speculation purely academic, however.
The Ninth Circuit has explicitly transformed nominative fair use into a
substitute for the traditional test to judge likelihood of confusion.228 This
shift—from regarding nominative fair use as a threshold showing or a
defense to approaching it as an alternate standard for the plaintiff’s prima
facie case—vitiated most of its usefulness. Instead of serving as an early
“gatekeeper” that can screen out fair uses and reduce the length and cost of
litigation, nominative fair use becomes just another fact-intensive confusion
inquiry that may be brought only after extensive discovery.
This substitution also shifts burdens unfairly.229 Nominative use was not
designed as a means to determine ultimate liability, but as a mechanism to

223. Id. at 308. As discussed infra at notes 234–36 and accompanying text, the Third Circuit
embraced this interpretation in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228
(3d Cir. 2005).
224. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
section 33(b)(4) but relying on New Kids factors for elements of defense).
225. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 307; see Barrett, supra note 139, at 432–33; Dogan & Lemley,
Grounding, supra note 7, at 1683–84.
226. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 23:11.
227. Kozinski, supra note 2, at 965–66, 977–78.
228. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002); Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002). But see Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337
F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 2003) (seeming to apply nominative fair use as a “defense”
although relying on likelihood of confusion considerations in doing so).
229. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217–21 (3d Cir.
2005) (noting how treating nominative use as a likelihood of confusion standard instead of a
defense shifts burdens unfairly).
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set aside cases that fall outside the bounds of trademark law. To be sure, in
some ways the reconstituted test accommodates free expression goals more
effectively than the usual multifactor likelihood of confusion test.230 But
instead of a list of factors to be weighed against one another, the New Kids
test is a checklist of requirements that must all be met independently.
Relying on it to judge ultimate liability could reduce the plaintiff’s burden of
proof concerning the prima facie showing of confusion.231 In principle, a
plaintiff could win in the Ninth Circuit without even proving likelihood of
confusion, by showing that (1) the expressive use was not necessary, or (2)
the degree of use exceeded what was necessary, or (3) the defendant
suggested sponsorship or endorsement by the plaintiff.232
The Third Circuit’s later decision in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Lendingtree, Inc. diagnosed the potential burden-shifting problem inherent
in the Ninth Circuit’s practice of combining the analyses for nominative use
and likelihood of confusion.233 Unfortunately, the majority opinion’s cure
was worse than the disease.234 It created a “bifurcated approach” to

230. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 350–52 (9th Cir. 1979). For example,
the nominative use test avoids Sleekcraft’s problematic focus on similarity of the marks, which as
we have seen can prejudice the inquiry against typical nominative use scenarios where the two
marks are not only similar, but identical. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
231. This is, of course, part of what KP Permanent forbids. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.
v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118–20 (2004) (noting that plaintiffs retain the
burden of proof concerning the prima facie showing of likelihood of confusion). There are
decent arguments for and against applying this precedent from a section 33(b)(4) case to
nominative use as well. Compare Century 21, 425 F.3d at 222–23 (applying KP Permanent to
nominative use), with id. at 244–46 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that KP Permanent precedent does not apply to nominative use). Either way, there is no
room to doubt that proving likelihood of confusion is the plaintiff’s burden. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1) (2000).
232. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992); see
Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 909 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The third
requirement . . . is merely the other side of the likelihood of confusion coin. Therefore . . . the
nominative fair use defense shifts to the defendant the burden of proving no likelihood of confusion.”
(emphasis added)).
233. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 217–21.
234. The court’s explanation illustrates its focus on the wrong issues for reducing the
chilling effect:
[T]he approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would relieve the
plaintiff of the burden of proving the key element of a trademark infringement
case—likelihood of confusion—as a precondition to a defendant’s even having to
assert and demonstrate its entitlement to a nominative fair use defense. The
Supreme Court in KP Permanent Make-Up clearly established that it was plaintiff's
burden in a classic fair use case to prove likelihood of confusion. . . . [L]ikelihood
of confusion and fair use can coexist. This does not mean that we should remove
the need for finding confusion in the first instance. Instead, once the plaintiff
proves likelihood of confusion, defendant only had [sic] to show that defendant’s
use, even if confusing, was ‘fair.’
Id. at 221.
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nominative fair use cases: henceforth, courts in the Third Circuit must first
consider a modified (but not much simplified or improved) version of the
multifactor likelihood of confusion test, and only afterward could their
nominative fair use analysis begin, using essentially the New Kids test.235
Instead of shortening the litigation, this structure makes it last even
longer.236 A defendant in an expressive use case must first litigate the whole
likelihood of confusion issue; only then, if this lengthy process does not
result in a favorable judgment, could the court turn to nominative use. The
Century 21 dissent objected to this “judicially unmanageable” structure but
only to support an argument for the Ninth Circuit’s alternative of
nominative use as a substitute confusion standard.237 None of these
approaches allows nominative fair use to serve as an early gatekeeper before
delving into likelihood of confusion.
A second independent problem with the development of the
nominative use doctrine in the Ninth Circuit arises from the unhelpful and
irrelevant standards that developed to differentiate it from “classic” fair use
claims under section 33(b)(4). Although New Kids elided the exact source of
the nominative fair use doctrine, the court differentiated its new test from
the existing statutory standard found in the “classic fair use case.”238 The
2002 opinion in Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co. attempted to separate the
doctrines in the Ninth Circuit under the following somewhat opaque
standard:
[C]ourts should use the New Kids nominative fair use analysis in
cases where the defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark to describe
the plaintiff’s product, even if the defendant’s ultimate goal was to
describe his own product. By contrast, courts should use the
traditional classic fair use analysis in cases where the defendant has
used the plaintiff’s mark only to describe his own product, and not
at all to describe the plaintiff’s product.239
This cumbersome test proved difficult to apply in common scenarios.
The “Food Chain Barbie” decision reckoned that the BARBIE doll’s
235. Id. at 222. Some Ninth Circuit cases also employ such a two-step analysis, first
reviewing the multifactor likelihood of confusion test and then considering whether the
defendant’s assertion of a nominative use defense is valid and whether it changes the confusion
result. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029–30 (9th
Cir. 2004).
236. In contrast, in a recent case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the parties agreed to a bench trial, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4607(RJS),
2008 WL 2755787, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008), and the court then resolved nominative use
without significant analysis of likelihood of confusion, id. at *25–29.
237. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 243–46 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“To be sure, this is not the classic fair use case . . . . We therefore do not purport to alter the
test applicable in the paradigmatic fair use case.”).
239. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002).
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trademarked appearance fell into both categories at once, since it described
both the original doll and the photographs depicting them in ridiculous
poses.240 Many courts still mix components of section 33(b)(4) and
nominative use, frequently producing messy hybrids.241 The Ninth Circuit
reached the apex of silliness in a case involving a former member of the
BEACH BOYS who used the band’s trademark to describe himself when
promoting his solo act; again, the mark described both the plaintiff and the
defendant to some degree.242 The court concluded that “the reference-totrademark-holder distinction often proves more frustrating than helpful”243
and devised a second distinction likely to produce even more comical
interpretive reasoning. It suggested that a “classic” fair use defense applies
when a defendant uses a trademark in its “primary, descriptive sense”—its
dictionary meaning, more or less.244 Demonstrating its new test, the court
opined that the BEACH BOYS mark did not “denote . . . ‘boys who frequent
a stretch of sand by the sea’” nor were the NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK
“‘children who recently moved to this area bounded by streets on four
sides.’”245 Both, therefore, were nominative fair use cases.246 This convoluted
standard offers many of those contemplating an expressive use little
guidance as to which doctrine might apply in the Ninth Circuit.247
240. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 809 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that “[t]hese two mutually exclusive forms of fair use are equally applicable” to the artist’s use
of the BARBIE doll trade dress).
241. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
section 33(b)(4) but relying on the New Kids factors for elements of defense); Ultimate
Creations, Inc. v. THQ, Inc., No. CV-05-1134-PHX-SMM, 2008 WL 215827, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan.
24, 2008) (listing and relying upon factors from both tests in denying summary judgment);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sharon Woods Collision Ctr., Inc., No. 1:07cv457, 2007 WL
4207158, at *7–8 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2007) (citing ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d
915, 920 (6th Cir. 2003), quoting text of section 33(b)(4), reviewing nominative use cases, and
ultimately concluding that a nominative use test should ask whether the mark was used (1) in its
descriptive sense, and (2) in good faith—nearly, but not entirely, the section 33(b)(4) test).
242. Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 905–07.
245. Id. at 907 & n.3.
246. Id.
247. Consider, for example, whether the aspects of the PLAY PEN trade dress and mark
featured in Grand Theft Auto describe the plaintiff (the real strip club) or the defendant (the ingame “East Los Santos” neighborhood). E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444
F. Supp. 2d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-56237 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006). In the
case, which was brought in a district court within the Ninth Circuit, the defendants did not raise
the classic fair use defense under section 33(b)(4). Id. at 1029. After a lengthy analysis, the
court found nominative use inapplicable because:
[The] purpose in using plaintiff’s trade dress and mark was not specifically to
identify, criticize, or refer to the Play Pen, but rather to create a strip club that fit
the virtual world of Los Santos, and was consistent with the theme and tone of San
Andreas. . . . Because the Pig Pen’s name and appearance are not identical to the
Play Pen’s mark and trade dress, the general “likelihood of confusion” test can be
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Not only are these distinctions messy, they are far removed from the
reasons for making them: deciding whether an expressive use should be
deemed a fair use in the face of an allegation of likely consumer confusion.
Of course, choosing which doctrine to apply became crucial in the Ninth
Circuit after nominative fair use turned into a form of likelihood of
confusion analysis while section 33(b)(4) remained an independent
defense. But since this doctrinal structure is itself questionable, it hardly
justifies the hair-splitting needed to decide which test to apply. Granted, too,
section 33(b)(4) is rooted in statutory language while nominative fair use
developed as judge-made doctrine. Even so, it does not matter normatively
whether an expressive use refers to the plaintiff, the defendant, both, or
neither.248
Finally, even if courts made nominative use available early in the
litigation and avoided becoming waylaid by distinctions with section
33(b)(4), on further examination, the factors included in the test itself do
not favor either clear or swift decisions. Instead, they too become swallowed
up in likelihood of confusion reasoning.
The first two New Kids factors—the necessity of using the mark and the
limited degree of use—in fact have little bearing on likelihood of confusion;
they serve merely to establish eligibility for an alternate test. Nominative use
cases rarely turn on either of these two factors. One exception was Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, involving a former Playboy Playmate who
subsequently promoted her modeling career independent of Playboy.249
The court found the “repeated, stylized use” of a well-known and
trademarked abbreviation for “PLAYMATE OF THE YEAR” as the
background wallpaper on Welles’s website used more of the mark than
necessary to provide her résumé.250
In most cases, unlike Welles, the merits of a nominative use case rapidly
boil down to the third requirement251 that the defendant “must do nothing
applied, and there is no need to look to the alternative, three-part test articulated
in New Kids on the Block.
Id. at 1034 (citations omitted).
248. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 223 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“Classic fair use and nominative fair use are different in certain respects, but it is unclear to us
why we should ask radically different questions when analyzing a defendant's ability to refer to a
plaintiff's mark in the two contexts.”); Moskin, supra note 4, at 873 (describing the similarities
of section 33(b)(4) and nominative fair use).
249. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
250. Id. at 804. Oddly, this holding came under the first prong of the test rather than the
second, although it seems clear that what troubled the court was the excessive quantity of the
repetitious use. Id. In any event, the court did not need to reach the third prong in its
consideration of the wallpaper. Id. The opinion also analyzed Welles’ metatags—which are not
expressive uses as defined for this article—under the nominative use test. Id. at 801–04.
251. In the BEACH BOYS case, the court rejected a nominative fair use argument on nearly
identical logic to the earlier Welles decision, but grounded the result in the third factor. Brother
Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). A disaffected former member of the
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that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.”252 What actions by trademark users
could carry such forbidden suggestions of sponsorship or endorsement?
Why, those that consumers are likely to find confusing in this regard, of
course.253 Yet again, as with trademark use and section 33(b)(4), the
nominative fair use doctrine degenerates into a substitute likelihood of
confusion metric that offers even less guidance and predictability than the
multifactor test.
Indeed, a defendant may have a more difficult time showing it did
nothing to cause confusion under the nominative fair use standard, rather
than defeating a plaintiff’s prima facie showing that confusion was likely to
result.254 The New Kids court itself said almost nothing about what sorts of
actions might create the wrongful suggestion.255 Not surprisingly, courts
often deny summary judgment for defendants because questions of fact
remain concerning this vague and possibly intent-based third factor.256 For
example, the Ninth Circuit has found the mere presence of a celebrity’s
likeness or trademark created enough possibility of implied endorsement to
foreclose summary judgment.257 Thus in many cases it is difficult to predict

BEACH BOYS began touring with another band as “The Beach Boys Family and Friends.” Id.
The court quickly held the first two factors satisfied, but found that the defendant’s
“promotional materials display ‘The Beach Boys’ more prominently and boldly than ‘Family
and Friends,’ suggesting sponsorship by the Beach Boys.” Id. The same fact would have
supported rejection of nominative use under the second factor also (or possibly, in line with the
Welles decision, the first factor). In Jardine, as in Welles, the concern that the defendant used “too
much” of the mark may have been legitimate, but it was placed awkwardly within the
nominative use test.
252. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
253. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 241 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Each and every one of the majority’s ‘nominative fair use’ prongs is nothing more than an
inquiry into likelihood of confusion . . . .”).
254. See Doellinger, supra note 83, ¶ 9 (arguing that the nominative fair use doctrine is less
favorable to defendants than standard likelihood of confusion analysis).
255. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308–09 (stating only that defendant “says nothing that expressly
or by fair implication connotes endorsement or joint sponsorship [of the poll] on the part of
the New Kids”).
256. E.g., Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Disc., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 932, 938–39
(E.D. Wisc. 2008) (brushing off a nominative use argument on summary judgment because
questions of fact remain on the third factor); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sharon Woods
Collision Ctr., Inc., No. 1: 07cv457, 2007 WL 4207158, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2007) (denying
summary judgment because of questions of fact on suggestion of sponsorship).
257. See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the appearance of a photograph of famous surfers in a clothing catalogue might thereby
have suggested endorsement by these celebrities); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d
407, 412–13 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Use of celebrity endorsements in television commercials is so well
established a commercial custom that a jury might find an implied endorsement . . . .”). Century
21 holds that “the mere presence or use of the mark does not suggest unfairness under this
prong,” but does not foreclose such holdings on the basis of additional facts. Century 21, 425
F.3d at 231.
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in advance whether an expressive use would clear this final all-important
hurdle.
The Third Circuit tinkered with this factor, but hardly improved its
clarity or its dependence on likelihood of confusion. The Century 21 version
of the third factor asks if “the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the
true and accurate relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant’s
products or services[.]”258 The basis for this judgment, once more, appears
to be the subjective understanding of an “ordinary consumer.”259
In sum, courts have gradually larded up the simple idea of nominative
fair use presented in New Kids to the point where it is excessively complex
and minimally useful. By moving the doctrine away from any role as an early
screening mechanism and closer in timing and substance to the likelihood
of confusion determination, subsequent cases have destroyed nominative
fair use. Aside from the Third Circuit, few other courts have adopted the test
recently. Perhaps the clearest indictment of nominative fair use comes from
the “Barbie Girl” case.260 Its facts seem a natural fit for the doctrine (the
song refers to BARBIE for purposes of identification) and nominative use
was the basis for the lower court’s decision in the defendants’ favor, yet the
appeals court relied instead on two other doctrines and did not reach a
review of the nominative fair use issues.261 The opinion was written, ten years
after New Kids, by Judge Kozinski.
D. FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING
The First Amendment provides greatly reduced protection for
commercial speech, defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction” in a manner “removed from any exposition of
ideas.”262 Most expressive uses, as defined above,263 go beyond proposing a
commercial transaction. Many involve important political, social, and artistic
speech of the type courts customarily protect. The First Amendment thus
hovers over all discussion of expressive trademark uses.264

258. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 230.
259. Id. at 231 (noting the district court’s previous holdings based on an “ordinary
consumer” standard and remanding to consider more and different facts).
260. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
261. Id. at 902. Instead of nominative fair use, the court applied First Amendment
balancing, see infra Part IV.D, and the federal dilution safe harbor, see infra Part IV.E.
262. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
263. See supra Part II. A.
264. There is extensive case law and scholarship concerning the interaction of First
Amendment doctrine with typical trademark cases. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 570 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,
203 (1982); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979); Denicola, supra note 2, at 165–66;
Kozinski, supra note 2, at 973; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 116, at 221; Ramsey, Descriptive,
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As this Part IV.D discusses, some courts have pulled that hovering
presence down to the ground by entertaining a “First Amendment defense”
for expressive uses.265 Courts must respect constitutional free speech
doctrine when regulating expressive uses, of course, but that does not mean
they should invite First Amendment balancing into the workaday
functioning of trademark cases.266 Constitutional rulings are the ultimate
heavy weapon of judicial interpretation. Like other statutes, trademark laws
should be interpreted to avoid any collisions with constitutional doctrine.267
Trademark fair use doctrine should internalize First Amendment concerns,
as does the copyright fair use defense.268
Aside from this serious jurisprudential concern, First Amendment
balancing now has a good substantive track record of protecting speech. It
was not always so. As recently as ten or fifteen years ago, the still-dominant
test for evaluating expressive uses was the “alternative avenues” approach,
which asked primarily whether the defendant had some other way to convey
the message embodied in the expressive use. This inquiry viewed the
trademark as a property interest akin to ownership of the private shopping
center that restricted leafleting in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.269 In this view,
trademark law was the equivalent of a “time, place, or manner” restriction
on speech. The most infamous trademark case in this vein is Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., a lawsuit by the Cowboys against the
makers of the pornographic movie Debbie Does Dallas, which portrayed
sexually explicit “Dallas Cowgirls” cheerleaders.270 Because the movie’s
expressive content—such as it was—could be conveyed through other means
supra note 115, at 1108; Ramsey, Increasing, supra note 116, at 383; Volokh, Freedom, supra note
116, at 712.
265. The McCarthy treatise characterizes the First Amendment issue as a defense, and
defendants often plead it that way. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 10:45; 5 id. §§ 28:15, 28:41.
But, in some cases, it functions more like a counterweight in the likelihood of confusion
analysis than like a distinct defense. The murkiness about its actual status is part of the problem.
266. Leval, supra note 83, at 209; McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1211–14. But see Ramsey,
Increasing, supra note 116, at 387 (arguing that courts in trademark cases should engage in
explicit First Amendment analysis).
267. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)
(avoiding interpretation of the Lanham Act that would suggest Congress had unconstitutionally
“created a species of perpetual patent and copyright”); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos,
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A]nti-dilution laws should be interpreted to provide
breathing room for First Amendment concerns.”); Leval, supra note 83, at 202–08 (reviewing
trademark cases based on how well they avoid needless constitutional rulings).
268. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations.”); McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1213 (“The First
Amendment only appears in [copyright] cases as a rhetorical flourish, because the balance
between the copyright monopoly and free speech is woven into the fabric of the Copyright Act
already through, among other things, its fair use doctrine.”).
269. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 552 (1972).
270. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir.
1979).
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without using the plaintiff’s marks, the court found no impediment to
trademark liability.271
The “alternative avenues” approach and unmitigated “property rights”
rhetoric were common nationwide.272 In one case, a coalition trying to stop
the closure of a BRACH’S candy factory used the BRACH’S logo on buttons
and stickers reading “Save Brach’s Coalition for Chicago.”273 The court
declared that “[t]rademarks are property rights,” and that “[b]eing enjoined
from using Brach’s logo, but not the Brach’s name, will not unduly hinder
[the defendant’s] ability to communicate its ideas.”274 A North Carolina
federal court, after characterizing the case as “an action by the plaintiff to
protect a private property right” and citing Lloyd Corp., struck a First
Amendment defense for lack of state action in a case involving imitations of
the old MASTER CHARGE cards that urged, “Give Christ charge of your
life.”275 More recently, a Minnesota federal court was swayed by “alternative
avenues” reasoning; the case concerned a Hollywood comedy about a
pageant to elect a small-town Minnesota beauty queen (often known in reallife Minnesota as a “dairy princess”), and the movie was to be called Dairy
Queens.276 Holding for the plaintiff DAIRY QUEEN restaurant chain, the
judge opined, “It is not for this Court to name films, but it appears [the
filmmaker] has rejected ideas such as ‘Dairy Princesses,’ ‘Milk Maids,’ or any
other formulation.”277
271. Id. at 206.
272. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757–78 (9th Cir. 1978)
(discussing alternatives to recognizable caricatures of Mickey Mouse and other Disney
characters); Reddy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630, 634
(D.D.C. 1977) (discussing alternative avenues of communication available to the defendant).
273. Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coalition for Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472,
475 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
274. Id. at 476.
275. Interbank Card Ass’n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 132–33 (M.D.N.C. 1977). There is
no longer any serious dispute that a trademark injunction is state action. See Denicola, supra
note 2, at 190 & n.146; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 116, at 219–21; Ramsey, Increasing, supra
note 116, at 407–08. But see Empire Home Servs., L.L.C. v. Empire Iron Works, Inc., No. 05-CV72584-DT, 2007 WL 1218717, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2007) (brushing aside a First
Amendment defense in part because the defendant had “not persuasively argued how its speech
rights vis-a-vis the government [were] implicated in its property dispute with” the plaintiff).
Incidentally, the heir to MASTER CHARGE did not fare as well in a later case involving
expressive use of its trademarks. See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc.,
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1046, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (granting summary judgment for a
presidential campaign’s parody of MASTERCARD advertisement).
276. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728–29 (D. Minn.
1998). The movie, later released under the much duller title Drop Dead Gorgeous, features a
surprising number of famous actresses (some of them less so at the time), including Kirsten
Dunst, Ellen Barkin, Allison Janney, Denise Richards, Kirstie Alley, and Brittany Murphy. See
The Internet Movie Database, Drop Dead Gorgeous (1999), http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0157503/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
277. Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734. Apparently, the adequacy or humor of the
alternative names was not a consideration.
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While “alternative avenues” reasoning still can be found in trademark
cases,278 it is in sharp decline.279 The change began back in 1989 with a pair
of cases in the Second Circuit, the same court that decided Dallas Cowboys.
The first, Rogers v. Grimaldi,280 involved a suit by Fred Astaire’s legendary
dance partner, Ginger Rogers, to enjoin release of Ginger and Fred, a
Federico Fellini film about two dancers. The appellate court specifically
repudiated the “alternative avenues” test as deferring too much to a
plaintiff’s asserted property interest in the mark while hindering artistic
expression.281 In its place, the court articulated a much improved basis for
the First Amendment doctrine: “We believe that in general the [Lanham]
Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in
free expression.”282 Unfortunately, the actual test advanced by the Rogers
court overcorrected the pro-plaintiff “alternative avenues” standard. It
suggested that a title for an expressive work could lead to liability only if “the
title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or
the content of the work.”283
This test presents three problems. First, the rule is unclear: What is the
cryptic and superfluous reference to “explicitly” misleading consumers? If a
title falsely describes the nature of the work, how can it ever be artistically
“relevant” to that work?284 Second, how is it structured procedurally?

278. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 200 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The
Defendants’ parody of the faddish bars of the sixties does not require the use of EPE’s marks
because it does not target Elvis Presley; therefore, the necessity to use the marks significantly
decreases and does not justify the use.”); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, No. 06-2341-JAR, 2008 WL
755069, at *31 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2008) (“The Court agrees with plaintiffs that there are many
ways in which defendants could express their views without allegedly infringing on KU’s
trademarks.” (citing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Neb. 1986),
aff’d, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987))); Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734 (proposing
alternative movie titles).
279. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 31:144 (reviewing the leading cases); Barrett, Internet
Trademarks, supra note 144, at 993–97 (“At this point, the majority of authority has rejected the
alternative avenues approach.”); Kerry L. Timbers & Julia Huston, The “Artistic Relevance Test”
Just Became Relevant: The Increasing Strength of the First Amendment as a Defense to Trademark
Infringement and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1278, 1279 (2003) (“The Second, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all expressly rejected the alternative avenues test . . . . ”). But see
Gulasekaram, supra note 128, at 906 (noting evolution away from older tests but cautioning that
these cases “[o]stensibly . . . remain good law and are still cited in support of federal court
decisions”).
280. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
281. Id. at 999 ; see Gulasekaram, supra note 128, at 903 (praising this aspect of Rogers).
282. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
283. Id.
284. See Timbers & Huston, supra note 279, at 1293–94. These authors wonder, for
example, if the Rogers court’s hypothetical title of The True Life Story of Ginger and Fred for
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Ascertaining whether a title misleads presumably requires fact-intensive
evidence about both consumer perceptions and the defendant’s intent. Yet
confusion avoidance apparently has dropped out of the standard, making it
difficult to imagine how infringement could ever be found.285 Third, the
Rogers opinion strives to limit its holding to the context of (1) allegedly
misleading titles (2) of artistic works (3) that use a celebrity’s name.286 This
cautious tendency to constrain precedential impact, also seen in subsequent
First Amendment cases, has “stunted the growth of a simple, unified
analysis.”287
Just four months later, the Second Circuit needed to decide how to
handle the Rogers precedent in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group, Inc.288 The solution was, more or less, to rewrite it. The
dispute concerned a parody of the well-known “study aid” by the editors of
Spy Magazine that imitated the trademarked appearance of the Cliffs Notes
cover.289 The court held that “the Rogers balancing approach is generally
applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression, a
category that includes parody. This approach takes into account the ultimate

Fellini’s film could be artistically relevant in the first place. Id. The answer, I think, is that it
could be humorous or ironic: what if the movie were about the blend of truth and reality
created by a fantasist obsessed with the dancers?
285. Difficult, but not impossible: a much later Sixth Circuit case, Parks v. LaFace Records,
329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003), conscientiously applied the Rogers test to a song by the acclaimed
hip-hop group OutKast entitled “Rosa Parks.” Id. at 450–51. The only oblique reference to the
civil rights icon anywhere in the song was the chorus:
Ah ha, hush that fuss
Everybody move to the back of the bus
Do you wanna bump and slump with us
We the type of people make the club get crunk.
Id. at 442–43. The appeals court, in an opinion that was detailed and methodical, if perhaps not
fully at ease with hip-hop vernacular, noted that a member of OutKast had testified that the
group “‘never intended for the song to be about Rosa Parks or the civil rights movement. It was
just symbolic, meaning that we comin’ back out, so all you other MCs move to the back of the
bus.’” Id. at 452 (citation omitted). The court concluded that this admission showed a dispute
of material fact. Id. at 452–53 (“The lyrics’ sole message is that OutKast’s competitors are of
lesser quality . . . . We believe that reasonable persons could conclude that there is no
relationship of any kind between Rosa Parks’ name and the content of the song.”).
286. Rogers, 875 F.3d at 999. As demonstrated by Parks, 329 F.3d 437, this situation is not
completely sui generis, but it is quite a narrow definition of the “context” where this newly
announced rule should apply.
287. Gulasekaram, supra note 128, at 916.
288. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1989).
289. According to the court, the Spy editors intended a “double parody,” in which the “flat,
straightforward, academic style” of Cliffs Notes would be applied to three then-hot novels
written by Tama Janowitz, Bret Easton Ellis, and Jay McInerney, which represented a genre of
“savvy, urban novels depicting the drug abuse, promiscuity, and post-adolescent angst of the
1980s.” Id. at 492.
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test in trademark law, namely, the likelihood of confusion . . . .”290 While this
may sound like adoption of the Rogers rule (and its expansion beyond titles
alone) the court did not apply—or even mention—the Rogers standard of
searching for any “artistic relevance.”291 Rather, it engaged in free-form
balancing to conclude that “the degree of risk of confusion between Spy
Notes and Cliffs Notes does not outweigh the well-established public interest
in parody.”292 In effect, Cliffs Notes took the statement of normative balance
used to justify the test in Rogers and turned it into the test itself.
This shift from an “alternative avenues” test to the two flavors of First
Amendment balancing (Rogers and Cliffs Notes) is responsible, in large part,
for the improvement in the substantive results of trademark fair use cases.
The First Amendment balancing tests did not make an impact right away—
even a pair of later opinions by Judge Leval and Judge Newman, the author
of Rogers, failed to reckon fully with expressive interests and ruled for the
plaintiffs.293 But now decisions throughout the country, including those in
the “Barbie Girl” and Grand Theft Auto cases, protect speech by relying on
some variant of these tests and reject “alternative avenues” reasoning.294
The procedural structure of a Rogers–Cliffs Notes approach, however,
exacerbates the problems of amorphousness and delay. First, the more freeform “balancing approach” taken by Cliffs Notes may do a better job of taking
likelihood of confusion “into account” than does the lenient “artistic
relevance” standard from Rogers. But it provides scant guidance about the
290. Id. at 495 (emphases added).
291. Id. at 494; Rogers, 875 F.3d at 999. The Cliffs Notes court unleashes several hair-splitting
run-on sentences to explain how it is guided by Rogers without adopting the test:
Appellee [Cliffs Notes] points out that the Rogers rule—that the Lanham Act’s false
advertising prohibition does not apply to titles with some artistic relevance to the
underlying work unless they are explicitly misleading . . . does not protect
“misleading titles that are confusingly similar to other titles. . . .” However, that
language says only that where a title is complained about because it is confusingly
similar to another title, the Rogers rule that titles are subject to the Lanham Act’s
false advertising prohibition only if explicitly misleading is inapplicable. But that
does not mean, as appellee appears to claim, that nothing in the Rogers opinion is
relevant to this case.
Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494 (citation omitted).
292. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495.
293. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, J.)
(granting plaintiff’s requested injunction); MGM-Pathe Commcn’s Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol,
774 F. Supp. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Leval, J.).
294. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the
“alternative avenues” reasoning and adopting the First Amendment balancing test); Mattel, Inc.
v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Westchester Media v. PRL
USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 671–73 & n.18 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000,
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1037–48 (C.D. Cal. 2006), appeal docketed,
No. 06-56237 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006) (same); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network
Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1552–53 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (same). For an excellent account
of the spread of these tests, see generally Timbers & Huston, supra note 279.
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means of weighing two abstract fundamental values that, if they can be
reckoned at all, are not calibrated by the same units of measurement.
Established First Amendment precedents in other areas shed no light
because courts do not invoke them in trademark cases, notwithstanding the
label they give this doctrinal balancing.295 For all the valid and
understandable criticisms of the four-factor fair use test in copyright,296 even
that test structures litigants’ arguments and judicial discretion more
effectively than the Cliffs Notes approach. Imagine the results if the copyright
fair use doctrine instructed courts only to balance the level of incentives
necessary to promote creation of the allegedly infringed work against the
established public interest in free expression.297
Additionally, the Second Circuit later modified this doctrine to require
completion of the multifactor likelihood of confusion test first, then a
consideration of First Amendment concerns, and only then a relative
weighing of the two.298 Just like the Ninth Circuit in section 33(b)(4)299 and
the Third Circuit in nominative fair use,300 the Second Circuit’s structure
condemns a defendant to litigate the most time-consuming and expensive
aspect of the case, no matter how compelling the free speech argument.
Such a defendant will win—eventually. But the resulting chilling effect
influences many more expressive uses than just the one before the court.
Finally, there is great variation among courts about the scope of
coverage of First Amendment balancing. Rogers covered titles of artistic
works, Cliffs Notes covered the content of works, and different courts have
followed one or the other precedent on this point.301 Similarly, some courts
have used the more forgiving Rogers “explicitly misleading” test, while others
follow the Cliffs Notes precedent by weighing speech against confusion in
some fashion (often without adopting the Second Circuit’s structure of
completing the multifactor test and instead placing a thumb on the scale
against a confusion finding).302

295. See generally Ramsey, Increasing, supra note 116 (arguing that First Amendment analysis
should play a larger role in trademark cases).
296. See sources cited supra note 57 and accompanying text.
297. For a thoughtful analysis of how courts might use such a broad copyright
fair use standard, see generally Fisher, supra note 57.
298. Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993); see
generally Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod’ns, Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996) (using the
likelihood of confusion test before looking at other concerns); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC
Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding First Amendment protections and
likelihood of confusion tests must be balanced).
299. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 233–37 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003);
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., v. Nature Labs LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
302. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 261 (4th
Cir. 2007); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2008);
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For all these reasons, even though the results of First Amendment
balancing protect speech interests much more effectively than did prior law,
the procedural structure of these cases contributes to new problems. By
considering speech as a counterweight to likelihood of confusion, the test
once again requires lengthy analysis based upon vague standards. First
Amendment balancing is subject to the same pitfalls as the other doctrines.
E. CATEGORICAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
The final fair use doctrine derives from explicit statutory exemptions,
many of which cover expressive uses as defined in this Article. Although
currently limited to federal dilution claims, these provisions in some ways
are much superior to the others analyzed in the rest of Part IV.
Unfortunately, a recent amendment—apparently intended to expand this
protection—could have the opposite effect.
In 1995, Congress passed a federal statute adding to the Lanham Act a
provision creating liability for trademark dilution.303 Dilution applies when a
use of a mark “lessen[s] the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services” even if the defendant’s use might not cause
confusion among consumers.304 This usually occurs because the defendant’s
use either “tarnishes” the reputation of the mark or “blurs” its
distinctiveness.305
Dilution potentially poses a particularly significant threat to free speech
because it is not connected to the rationale of preventing consumer
confusion, and it especially singles out uses that criticize a mark.306 In
response to these free speech concerns, Congress included a set of
categorical exemptions from dilution liability in the original statute:
The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.307

Woodard v. Jackson, No. 1:03-cv-0844-DFH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6292, at *15 (S.D. Ind. Mar.
25, 2004); Charles Atlas, Ltd., 112 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
303. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985–
986 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)).
304. Id.; see Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429–31 (2003).
305. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425.
306. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
features of dilution law that increase tension with free speech for expressive uses); LaFrance,
supra note 32, at 470–71, 487–88 (same).
307. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000).
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Cases interpreting subsections (A) and (C) are rare. There are a few
cases that quickly consider the comparative advertising exception and apply
it in the defendant’s favor.308 In October 2007, a South Carolina district
court decided BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, the first and (so far) only case to
consider the news reporting exemption.309 Although there were
shortcomings in its reasoning, the court quite easily found the exemption
applied to a series of four blog posts that complained about bad service the
defendant had received from the plaintiff and gave advice to others in
similar situations.310 (It is also notable that the victorious defendant had
proceeded pro se.311)
By hypothesis, plaintiffs hardly ever bring these two types of claims
because they cannot win. The unambiguous statutory language preventing
liability would lead to early dismissal and perhaps an award of attorney’s fees
against the plaintiff for bringing a frivolous case.312 Extending this
hypothesis, it seems likely that someone contemplating an expressive use
within these carve-outs could rely on them with a high degree of confidence
and could respond to any prelitigation cease-and-desist demand with a
simple citation to the statutory protection. The chilling effect should be
reduced commensurately.
The safe harbor for “noncommercial use of a mark” did not define the
slippery concept of commerciality; not surprisingly, it did not have quite the
same effect in dissuading plaintiffs from suing.313 Then, in 2002, Judge

308. See, e.g., Toni & Guy (USA) Ltd. v. Nature’s Therapy Inc., No. 03 CV 2420(RMB), 2006
WL 1153354, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006); Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 32
F. Supp. 2d 561, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The comparative advertising exception is limited to
competing goods and so does not extend to some other references that commercial defendants
might make to a plaintiff’s marks, such as a statement that the defendant sells or repairs
plaintiff’s goods. See, e.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 489–90 (5th
Cir. 2004) (designing instead an “aftermarket use” exception); Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 351–352 (9th Cir. 1969) (using an early version of
the nominative use doctrine).
309. BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445, at *4–5 (D.S.C. Oct. 22,
2007). This exemption was not altered by the amendment discussed below. See infra notes 326–
33.
310. BidZirk, 2007 WL 3119445, at *6–7. The core of the court’s analysis, which turns on
the finding that the story was “written for the purpose of conveying information to the public,”
id. at *6, is straightforward. Some surrounding dicta may suggest, however, that the exemption
would not have applied if “the sole purpose of the article was to denigrate” the plaintiff. Id. at
*7. In another case, this standard could lead to an ill-advised inquiry into a defendant’s
subjective journalistic motivations.
311. Id. at *1. There are indications that counsel for the plaintiff may have done more
harm than good: for example, the court sua sponte sanctioned them for improperly filing a lis
pendens against the defendant’s condominium. Id. at *7–9.
312. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(3) (2000) (“The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).
313. See, e.g., Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
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Kozinski’s opinion in the “Barbie Girl” case advanced a persuasive argument
that “noncommercial” uses covered by this exemption include all uses that
fall outside the limited category of commercial speech under First
Amendment jurisprudence.314 In other words, the only speech eligible for
dilution liability is speech that “does no more than propose a commercial
transaction” and is “removed from any exposition of ideas.”315 The decision
noted that a narrower interpretation would lead to inconsistency with
another section of the statute and possible constitutional infirmities.316 The
legislative history also strongly supported the court’s broad reading.317
Judge Kozinski’s reading of the noncommercial use exemption would
allow straightforward and relatively early resolution across the board. The
chilling effect would be radically reduced in federal dilution cases. Other
courts, including those deciding the “Walocaust,” “Food Chain Barbie,” and
“TaftQuack” disputes, have since adopted Judge Kozinski’s analysis and
applied it as a broad exclusion to federal dilution claims.318 Thus the
noncommercial use exclusion has now been interpreted as a per se
exemption for a wide variety of expressive uses, including parody.319 If this
understanding becomes widely accepted, then the less-than-lucid statutory
language might become a fairly clear categorical exclusion (although subject
to any future instability in First Amendment commercial speech
jurisprudence320).
However, this seemingly happy conclusion requires several
qualifications right away. First, the categorical exemptions are limited to
federal dilution claims—not state claims, and not traditional infringement
claims. Many expressive use cases arise in the context of state dilution laws,
which frequently contain fewer inherent safeguards for speech than the

314. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2002).
315. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)).
316. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 904–05.
317. Id. at 905–06. The opinion quoted Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), to justify reliance on legislative history when “plain meaning
‘produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result.’” MCA Records, 296 F.3d. at 905.
318. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan,
266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695–97 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see also Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 973–74 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a television show was
noncommercial speech and therefore covered by the noncommercial use exception under the
federal dilution statute); Griffith v. Fenrick, 486 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (holding
that the noncommercial use exception applied to a political candidate who changed his name
to Andy Griffith).
319. But see Patrick D. Curran, Comment, Diluting the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
“Noncommercial Use” and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1077, 1098–99
(2004) (criticizing this interpretation as overly broad).
320. See Ramsey, Increasing, supra note 116, at 412.
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federal statute.321 For example, the “TaftQuack” court needed to analyze the
Ohio state dilution claim separately because the federal safe harbor did not
apply.322 Nor does any such “noncommercial use” exclusion apply to
traditional infringement claims, and it might be unwise to create one quite
as broad.323 Expansive speech protection against dilution liability makes
sense because it does not involve the same problems of consumer confusion
(or the same burdens on the plaintiff to prove confusion).324 Indeed, it
appears Congress specifically chose in 2006 not to extend the dilution carveout to infringement claims under the Lanham Act.325
A second, and possibly more serious, caveat arises from Congress’s
amendment of the exclusions in 2006.326 The new text, which is just about
twice as long as the old version, needlessly muddies the law’s clarity:
Exclusions. – The following shall not be actionable as dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person
other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or
services, including use in connection with—
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to
compare goods or services; or

321. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (1980) (Maine state dilution law containing
no safe harbor exceptions); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360 (McKinney 1997) (New York dilution law
containing no safe harbor exceptions); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682,
692 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“Federal law also explicitly exempts from coverage three uses of
trademark . . . . Under Ohio law . . . there are no express exemptions from coverage.”).
322. Am. Family Life, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (ruling that Ohio dilution law required that the
defendant use a mark “virtually identical” to plaintiff’s and commenting in the alternative that
the court would otherwise have found dilution liability foreclosed by the First Amendment); see
also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27, 32–34 (1st Cir. 1987) (avoiding
First Amendment problems by giving a narrow interpretation to Maine state dilution law, which
has no safe harbor exceptions).
323. But see infra Part V.B (discussing other possible safe harbors from infringement
liability).
324. See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 904–05.
325. Until the 2006 revision of federal dilution law, the exemptions applied to “this
section,” which some observers were just beginning to argue might apply to infringement
actions related to unregistered marks brought under section 43 of the Lanham Act. Congress
changed the language of the exclusion so that it now unambiguously refers to the “subsection”
involving only dilution. See Levy, supra note 37, at 1203–04 (discussing the change and its
implications); Posting of William McGeveran to Info/Law Blog, Trademark Fair Use and
the Great “Section/Subsection Debate,” http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/05/10/
trademark-fair-use-and-the-great-sectionsubsection-debate/ (May 10, 2006) (same).
326. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730,
1731 (2006). The amendment also moved the exclusions from 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) to
§ 1125(c)(3).
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(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the
famous mark owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.327
It is too early to evaluate the impact of this new language in full, but
several likely problems become clear at once. The addition of “nominative
or descriptive fair use” threatens to import all the problems of those two
doctrines into the dilution exclusions.328 These doctrines are the antithesis
of simple categorical safe harbors. Furthermore, clause (A)(ii) appears to be
limited to speech directed toward the markholder, which might not include, for
example, the wordplay of JOY OF SIX or “TaftQuack” to convey other
messages.329 Finally, the amendment adds the condition, at least as to
subparagraph (A), that a fair use not be “a designation of source for the
person’s own goods and services.”330 We have seen in our review of every
doctrine how grounding trademark fair use in the issue of use “as a mark”
returns the analysis straight back into the likelihood of confusion quagmire.
A defendant who engaged in comparative advertising or parody, and who
formerly could rely on a blanket exemption, now must show that the use was
not source-identifying.331 Even more bizarre: the issue is not even relevant,
since dilution is not concerned with likelihood of confusion; dilution
plaintiffs need not prove it, but a defendant who hopes to rely on this
exclusion must disprove it.
Perhaps worst of all, the new statute mentions parody and other specific
examples of fair use covered by the conditions of subparagraph (A) but also
leaves the previous exemption for noncommercial use untouched in
subparagraph (C). If Judge Kozinski is correct that the noncommercial
speech exemption corresponds to the constitutional commercial speech
doctrine, then the new language in clause (A)(ii) is surplusage: parody,
327. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3) (West 2008) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000)).
328. See supra Parts IV.B & IV.C (describing the nominative and descriptive use doctrines).
329. Levy, supra note 37, at 1208–09 (citing, as an example, “Walter Mondale’s put-down of
Gary Hart during the 1984 primaries, using the Wendy’s slogan ‘Where’s the Beef’”).
330. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3).
331. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266 (4th Cir.
2007) (“Although the TDRA does provide that fair use is a complete defense and allows that a
parody can be considered fair use, it does not extend the fair use defense to parodies used as a
trademark.”). In this case, the court ruled that there was no dilution-by-blurring only by
running through the underlying six-factor test for dilution liability and concluded, “Even as
Haute Diggity Dog’s parody mimics the famous mark, it communicates simultaneously that it is
not the famous mark, but is only satirizing it.” Id. at 267. This sounds exactly like Judge Leval’s
formula for judging parody by likelihood of confusion. See supra note 84 and accompanying
text. Moreover, the Louis Vuitton court cautions that the outcome might be different “if the
parody is so similar to the famous mark that it likely could be construed as actual use of the
famous mark itself.” Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 268.
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comment, and critique are all noncommercial speech for constitutional
purposes. The new language thus complicates the broad reading of the
noncommercial use exemption. Read as a whole, the new statute seems to
cover cases like “Barbie Girl,” “Food Chain Barbie,” and “TaftQuack” under
clause (A)(ii). In a case like AFLAC, however, there might be a decent
argument that consumers could see the political duck as emanating from
the company, thus disqualifying it from this exemption. Moreover, canons of
statutory interpretation would disfavor a reading of “noncommercial use”
that rendered the new clause totally unnecessary.332
Congress and observers both believed that the new statutory language
improved and expanded protection for speech.333 In fact, it does just the
opposite. However future courts solve the riddles described above, the
amendment eliminated the exclusions’ principal advantage of
unambiguousness. Cases untangling these interpretive questions, at least for
the time being, will no longer be clear and quick. This revision is a textbook
example of the overall problem in trademark fair use: Congress was so
concerned with striking a more perfect balance between protecting
trademarks and speech in every case that it could not leave a simple rule
intact.
Overall, the five doctrines analyzed in this Part do little to address the
procedural factors that chill expressive uses. It is time to rethink trademark
fair use. Part V begins this process with an emphasis on clear doctrine and
speedy litigation rather than on a perfect encapsulation of the conflicting
substantive goals.
V. RETHINKING TRADEMARK FAIR USE
Our tour through the law applicable to expressive uses illuminates the
failings of existing doctrines. This Part contemplates how to fix them. If we
were starting from scratch, how would we design trademark fair use? Section
A identifies some of the lessons we can learn from the foregoing critique.
Section B suggests that courts can decide many expressive use cases—

332. On the other hand, the fact that Congress retained the noncommercial use exemption
without repudiating the broad interpretation might be seen as an indicator that the law should
be considered unchanged. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 573 (2007) (citing
Congress’s failure to alter the statute as evidence for a broad interpretation while noting that
courts “ordinarily . . . resist reading congressional intent into congressional inaction”).
333. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H6963, H6965 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006) (remarks of Rep.
Smith) (stating that new TDRA exemptions would “more clearly protect traditional first
amendment uses”); Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act Rolls Out a
Luxury Claim and a Parody Exemption, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 205, 221 (2007) (“The TDRA also may
be viewed as fuel for consumer and competitive discourse because it articulated relatively broad
fair use provisions.”); William Joern, Comment, Goodwill Harboring: The Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006 Legitimates the Goodwill Investment in a Trademark While Safeguarding the First
Amendment, 17 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 267, 291 (2007) (“The defenses to a claim
of dilution have been substantially buttressed . . . .”).
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including some of the most important ones—on the basis of fairly
straightforward categorical exemptions. Section C then notes other
procedural mechanisms for addressing somewhat tougher cases that courts
could not resolve through blanket exemptions, but nevertheless could
handle in a manner that reduces the problematic chilling effect.
A. SOME LESSONS FROM THE FAILURE OF CURRENT LAW
This Part summarizes three important lessons to draw from the failures
of existing trademark fair use law. First, fundamental similarities in the
various fair use doctrines overwhelm much of their differences. Minor
distinctions between them do not serve the central purposes of trademark
law or of fair use. Second, most of the various defenses for expressive uses
collapse into alternate standards for consumer confusion. Courts using the
existing fair use rules therefore replicate, rather than replace, the problems
with the likelihood of confusion analysis, all while failing to recognize or
admit that they do so. The final and most basic lesson derives from these
first two: an excessive emphasis on identifying and preventing any degree of
confusion in each individual case has overwhelmed trademark fair use.
Whatever marginal protection current doctrine offers to trademarks’ source
identification functions does not justify the high administrative costs and
chilling effect that result.
1.

Distinctions Without Differences

Recall the unfortunate court that tried to ascertain which doctrine
applied to the facts before it, and was reduced to asking whether the NEW
KIDS ON THE BLOCK really meant “‘children who recently moved to this
area bounded by streets on four sides.’”334 This tangential inquiry
determined whether the dispute should be analyzed as a section 33(b)(4)
case or a nominative fair use case. The decision mattered for procedural,
not substantive, reasons—that is, because the doctrines operated differently,
not because the values at stake differed in any meaningful way. The same
observation applies throughout the byzantine tangle of doctrines for judging
expressive uses: all of them measure essentially the same interests. Why,
then, should they be structured so differently?
Another way to think about this phenomenon is to take some of the fact
patterns considered throughout this Article and try different doctrines on
for size.335 The “Food Chain Barbie” case turned on nominative fair use, but
the “Barbie Girl” case—written about the same trademark, just a year earlier,

334. Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 907 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing New
Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)); see supra notes
241–46 and accompanying text.
335. See Moskin, supra note 4, at 873 (“[T]here is far more that fair use cases have in
common than there is that separates them.”).
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in the same circuit, and by the author of New Kids—relied instead upon
Rogers v. Grimaldi reasoning to analyze infringement.336 As another example,
consider the reliance the JOY OF SIX court placed on section 33(b)(4),
even though there was no way to argue that the phrase described the Chicago
Tribune or its services.337 If the Ninth Circuit defined section 33(b)(4) as
loosely, then it could have applied that doctrine to the use of the PLAY PEN
trademarks in Grand Theft Auto to “mimic the look and feel of real-life
locations and businesses.”338 Likewise, the AFLAC court denied a
preliminary injunction because it considered the evidence of likelihood of
confusion insufficient; another court might just as well have grounded this
conclusion in nominative fair use or First Amendment reasoning.339
There are several negative consequences of the blurry boundaries
between these doctrines. Some of those arise in litigation. The initial
determination about what doctrine to apply becomes a complex and
distracting side argument. The confused landscape also encourages sloppy
reasoning by courts that mix elements of multiple tests.
The more serious impact emerges earlier, before any suit is filed, when
the chilling effect occurs. Imagine an average person—not a lawyer—who is
contemplating an unlicensed expressive use of a trademark and
understandably worries about liability. The person asks an attorney for
advice. The bottom line of the response should be that courts usually favor
expressive uses. But, it will need to be accompanied by a lengthy memo, full
of caveats, which cites in the alternative to a series of amorphous precedents,
warns that those cases are all fact-specific, and predicts that litigation may be
protracted.340 This response might not inspire great confidence.
The lack of solid reassurance could intimidate others besides the wouldbe speaker. As we have seen, risk-averse gatekeepers, such as distributors or
insurance providers, often forbid unlicensed expressive uses.341 I believe the
difficulty of providing clear advice may discourage attorneys from providing
the sort of pro bono advice that could benefit many individuals using
336. Compare Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 808 (9th Cir. 2003),
with Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The court resolved the
dilution claim in the “Barbie Girl” case through the noncommercial use exemption. See MCA
Records, 296 F.3d at 904–07.
337. Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 639–43 (7th Cir. 2001).
338. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1041 (C.D.
Cal. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-56237 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006).
339. Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
340. As I wrote elsewhere:
If you have ever tried to counsel a client who wishes to use a trademark for
expression, then you have confronted the deeply muddled state of the law
governing such uses. There are many routes to a final adjudication, but none is
clear and it is difficult to know in advance which ones a court might employ.
McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1214.
341. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
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trademarks expressively. Most of all, an attorney trying to draft a strong
response to a C&D would rather cite one clear rule instead of attaching a
complex memo filled with what-ifs.
The most significant objection, however, is the simplest one: many
distinctions between these doctrines do not serve a valuable purpose. The
ultimate goal of all the trademark fair use doctrines is to balance the
prevention of consumer confusion under trademark law with the protection
of free speech. Inquiries such as the Ninth Circuit’s about whether an
expressive use describes a plaintiff, a defendant, or both342 do not affect this
balance. They have become their own justification, built up by precedent,
but have no reliable connection to speech interests or likelihood of
confusion.
2.

The Gravitational Pull of Likelihood of Confusion

The second lesson that emerges time and again from reviewing the
doctrines is the difficulty of escaping from a comprehensive evaluation of
likelihood of confusion, even when applying tests that aim to be more
efficient screening mechanisms to identify easy cases. Part IV showed how
every trademark fair use doctrine exhibits this tendency: trademark use
theory, the third factor of nominative use, the “use as a mark” prong of
section 33(b)(4), the incorporation of likelihood of confusion into many
First Amendment balancing tests, and the federal trademark dilution
statute’s amended exemptions.
At root this is unsurprising. After all, the core mission of trademark law
is to prohibit uses of marks that are “likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive” as to the source of plaintiff’s or defendant’s
products.343 Courts want to protect free speech without scuttling this
mission, and so they engage in case-specific inquiries that measure the
importance of both interests in every case and strike a balance. The Ninth
Circuit’s treatment of the KP Permanent case illustrates the strong
gravitational pull of preventing confusion in trademark cases. The court
already had adhered to a rule that any likelihood of confusion foreclosed
the section 33(b)(4) defense; then, after the Supreme Court repudiated this
rule, the court came as close as possible to reinstituting it on remand.344

342. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150–52 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing
between “classic fair use” and “nominative fair use”).
343. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2000).
344. Supra notes 179–91 and accompanying text; see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 607–09 (9th Cir. 2005) (requiring the defendant to
disprove likelihood of confusion before prevailing under section 33(b)); KP Permanent MakeUp, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding likely
consumer confusion precludes fair use); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248
(9th Cir. 1984) (same).
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As Part III explained, however, there are several problems with relying
on the particularized inquiry into confusion as the principal measure of
liability in expressive use cases. First, the determination of likely confusion is
usually a long and expensive undertaking. When the other doctrines
collapse into this analysis, they lose the advantages that would come from
early and efficient screening mechanisms to weed out fair uses. Second, as
confusion prevention grows in importance in applying any of the doctrines,
it can overshadow the free speech interests that necessitated creation of a
new rule in the first place, so that the nominative fair use doctrine or section
33(b)(4) become merely alternative routes to answering the same question.
By trying to strike a completely perfect balance between the economic
and expressive interests in every case, courts make the standards more
complicated and more fact-intensive, increasing the chilling effect on
expressive uses.
3.

Enforcement Costs

Robert Bone has emphasized the important role of enforcement costs
in the design of trademark doctrine overall.345 Trademark rules, like all
rules, reach compromises between accuracy and efficiency. Enforcement
costs include the administrative costs of adjudicating an issue as well as error
costs—the social costs of a mistaken outcome multiplied by the frequency of
such errors.346 For example, a well-established hierarchical classification in
trademark law requires greater evidence of secondary (source-identifying)
meaning for marks that are descriptive (e.g., FISH-FRI for fish batter), less
proof for suggestive marks (e.g., COPPERTONE for sunscreen), and
essentially no evidence for fanciful and arbitrary marks (e.g., POLAROID for
cameras and SUN for computers347) that are presumed “inherently
distinctive” and therefore source-identifying.348
As Bone explains, this classification of marks, and the resulting variation
in the protection they may receive, is an imperfect proxy for a searching
examination of the secondary meaning of every mark in every case.349
Securing and evaluating the necessary proof is very expensive, and it is fairly
safe to assume that fanciful or arbitrary marks usually have secondary
meaning for consumers (indeed, fanciful coined marks like POLAROID
have no other meaning). Since errors will be unusual, and the negative
social cost of false positives fairly small, the high administrative costs of a
345. Bone, supra note 5, at 2123–43.
346. Id. at 2123–25.
347. Fanciful marks are coinages without any prior meaning (POLAROID), while arbitrary
marks are real words applied to products unrelated to their meaning (SUN). See Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 n.12 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing the hierarchy of
the various types of marks).
348. Bone, supra note 5, at 2127–28; see Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9–11.
349. Bone, supra note 5, at 2125–34.
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more particularized review are not justified. The law instead uses a
presumption as a rough proxy for that fuller inquiry.350 Of course, holders
of descriptive marks benefit from no such presumption and must present
their proof because it is much more likely that such a mark could lack
secondary meaning.
Bone’s analysis can profitably be extended to address the problems with
trademark fair use. A desire to strike the ideal balance between confusion
and speech in every case has driven the administrative costs of trademark
fair use very high. Under this pressure, as just noted, the putative simplicity
of doctrines such as nominative fair use and even the statutory dilution
exemptions collapse into the more complex fact-intensiveness of likelihood
of confusion.
At the same time, we can identify certain recurring types of expressive
uses where a finding of no confusion is very likely overall, similar to the
probability that fanciful or arbitrary marks will identify source. An occasional
false negative—that is, an erroneous finding of no liability for an expressive
use that did cause some amount of consumer confusion—would be tolerable
if it happened fairly infrequently and the degree of confusion were
acceptably small. The Supreme Court said as much in KP Permanent.351
Other free speech doctrines have reached this same resolution, such as the
actual malice standard in defamation, the right to anonymous speech, and
the true threats doctrine.352 We can afford to allow some minor increase in
error costs to enable a significant decrease in the very high administrative
costs of adjudicating trademark fair use.
Whether or not Judge Kozinski thought of it quite this way,353
nominative fair use sought to do just that. In New Kids, the test allowed for a
straightforward ruling in favor of the expressive use at issue.354 Later
modifications by the Ninth and Third Circuits, however, added detail and
additional steps and moved the test closer to likelihood of confusion
itself.355 Eventually, the administrative costs became so high that the test lost
much of its original value.

350. Id. at 2131–32 (“Because of the high probability that these marks already have or will
soon acquire secondary meaning, the conclusive presumption is very likely to be correct most of
the time. Moreover, the conclusive presumption saves the litigation costs of actually proving
secondary meaning in individual cases.”).
351. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004)
(“[S]ome possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use.”).
352. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
353. Bone notes that judges may or may not explicitly or consciously rely on this concept of
enforcement costs, but that it has considerable force as an explanation of why judges reach the
decisions they do. Bone, supra note 5, at 2103.
354. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308–09 (9th Cir. 1992);
see supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Part IV.C.
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The task, then, is clear: design trademark fair use doctrines that reduce
administrative costs while maintaining an acceptable margin of error. The
critique up to this point shows what courts should avoid: inflexible
postponement of trademark fair use until other more involved questions are
analyzed; distracting side inquiries to choose between doctrines; and, most
of all, the importation of case-specific likelihood of confusion reasoning into
every trademark fair use decision. The remainder of this Part seeks to put
those lessons to good use.
B. SAFE HARBORS FOR TRADEMARK FAIR USE
This Part proposes several categorical exemptions, or safe harbors, from
infringement liability. If chosen judiciously, the categories excluded would
be ones where, under current law, the social cost of curtailing valuable
expression outweighs the utility of a complex inquiry into the impact on the
economic functions of trademarks. Such exemptions should reduce
administrative costs that fuel the prelitigation chilling effect.356 To succeed,
their structural design must avoid both complex threshold tests to
determine whether the exemption applies and also case-specific analysis of
the likelihood of confusion. They also need relatively bright-line
formulations to improve the possibility that a case can be adjudicated early.
The exemptions should be structured as defenses, giving an alleged
infringer control to raise them as soon as any necessary evidence becomes
available (although their clarity should require little or no heavy factfinding). As a comparison, consider the statutory safe harbor protecting
certain Internet providers from liability for torts such as defamation arising
from user-generated content.357 Internet providers may, depending on
circumstances, raise that safe harbor as a defense at the preliminary
injunction stage, a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage, or an early
summary judgment motion before, during, or after discovery.358
Because they are not suitable for all expressive uses, safe harbors cannot
and should not displace all other trademark fair use or likelihood of
confusion doctrine.359 Rather, they would be the first layer of protection—

356. Although the focus here remains on expressive uses as defined in Part II.A, supra, this
same strategy of categorical exemptions also might work well as an approach to other
controversial uses, such as keyword advertising, metatags, and domain name disputes. See
Goldman, Deregulating, supra note 25, at 588–95.
357. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
358. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (granting motion
for judgment on the pleadings based upon the § 230 safe harbor); DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp.
2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based upon the
safe harbor); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting summary
judgment early in litigation based upon the safe harbor).
359. Note, too, that exclusions of trademark liability do not affect other claims that
sometimes might be brought in these cases, including copyright infringement or various forms
of trade libel, false advertising, and unfair competition.
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defenses that identify certain types of easy cases with little or no litigation. A
case that could not be dismissed based upon these clear rules might still be
analyzed under existing trademark fair use doctrines such as section
33(b)(4). Cases that still could not be eliminated would be handled under
the traditional likelihood of confusion rubric.360 But, well-designed
exemptions still could simplify and expedite decisions for a larger number
of fair uses than does existing doctrine.
First, notwithstanding the 2006 amendment to the dilution statute, I
would propose that Judge Kozinski’s broad interpretation of the
noncommercial use exemption from dilution liability should remain in
force, either as a matter of consistent interpretation and constitutional
avoidance or, if necessary, through amendment of the statute.361 Any
expressive use that does more than “propose a commercial transaction”362
should be immune from dilution liability, regardless of any other
considerations. Because there is no reason to limit this rule to federal dilution
claims, courts should apply it to state claims as well.
If these recommendations were followed, truly expressive uses would
almost never violate dilution law. While sweeping, this exclusion makes
sense. Unlike traditional trademark infringement law, which protects the
public and the market as well as the plaintiff, the plaintiff receives the main
benefits of dilution liability.363 The social costs of false negatives are
therefore much lower. The classic examples of strictly commercial
trademark dilution, such as KODAK bicycles, would of course remain
outside the safe harbor.364 All the evidence suggests that this arrangement
fulfills congressional intent both when the statute first passed in 1995 and
when it was amended in 2006.

360. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 25, at 1662 (proposing that the
likelihood of confusion test should be central but operate in conjunction with “defenses and
limitations” and “safe harbor[s]” that would serve as “rule-based adjuncts”); Widmaier, supra
note 139, at 621–24 (proposing serial layers of defenses beginning with trademark use theory,
proceeding through trademark fair use and other defenses, and ending in likelihood of
confusion analysis); see also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 57, at 1489 (proposing a
similar structure for copyright safe harbors as adjuncts to traditional copyright fair use analysis).
361. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that speech not classified as commercial speech under First Amendment doctrine qualifies for
this exemption); supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (discussing MCA Records and the
dilution safe harbors).
362. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)).
363. See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 904–05 (explaining why dilution poses a greater threat to
First Amendment values than does traditional infringement); Tushnet, supra note 32, at 555
(demonstrating flaws in arguments that consumers or markets benefit from dilution liability).
364. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813,
825 (1927) (discussing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 Rep. Pat. Cas. 105 (1898), as
an example of purely commercial trademark dilution).
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Infringement safe harbors require more care because the error costs of
unchecked consumer confusion are higher. Nonetheless, the safe harbor for
“[a]ll forms of news reporting and news commentary,” which remained
untouched in the amended dilution statute, fits equally well with
infringement and should be extended to that context.365 While it is always
possible that some members of the public might become confused by some
expressive uses of marks in news, the probability is low. The social costs of a
procedural structure that chills reporting or commentary outweigh that
small margin of error. Reducing the administrative costs for vindication of
expressive uses will reduce those social costs as well.
This exclusion obviously covers all expressive uses by traditional
journalists in mainstream media outlets, but it should be interpreted more
broadly.366 By all indications, those users have felt relatively little pressure to
avoid unlicensed trademarks. The real beneficiaries of this exclusion would
be speakers with weaker institutional support and a lack of professional
credentials. Thus, online citizen media such as blogging or contributions to
wikis and message boards should be covered, allowing them to use any
trademarks in the course of their reporting or commentary.367 The same
should hold for documentaries and books discussing current affairs and
related issues.368 Associated commercial activity, such as the sale of

365. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(C) (2000). The wording could perhaps be improved upon, but
as we see from the “noncommercial use” exclusion, what really matters is the judicial
interpretation of the language. One alternate model to consider is California’s right of publicity
statute, which exempts any use of a celebrity’s name or image “in connection with any news,
public affairs, or sports broadcast or account.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 1997).
366. At a minimum, the use of “THE JOY OF SIX” in the Chicago Tribune headline would be
exempt from trademark infringement liability. Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 647
(7th Cir. 2001).
367. See generally, e.g., CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000) (allowing
defendant to use the plaintiff’s mark on website in criticizing markholder); BidZirk, LLC v.
Smith, No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007) (allowing defendant to use
BidZirk’s trademark on personal blog to comment on markholder’s unsatisfactory customer
service).
368. See, e.g., Heins & Beckles, supra note 72, at 20–21 (reporting on documentary
filmmakers cutting scenes that happen to include trademarks). One documentary filmmaker in
a focus group stated:
I cut a scene from a film because there was a big cup with this gas station
trademark on it, but the problem is, you can’t go into a store, you can’t buy
anything that doesn’t have a logo on it. So they don’t give you the option of having
a cup with no logo, but I was like, “oh god, I didn’t realize that cup had this huge
logo in the side of the frame.” Why did she think this would create a problem?
“Because the subject of the film was coming clean about an addiction. It’s a very
heavy scene. It’s not pretty in any way, and I don’t think they would have wanted to
be associated with it.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted). The authors correctly note that this should not even qualify as
infringement, id. at 21 & n.120, but the unsettled state of the law and the risk aversion of
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memorabilia reproducing the “JOY OF SIX” headline,369 or advertisements
for the news, might present a trickier case, but I believe a court should deem
these uses a natural extension of news reporting and include them in the
safe harbor.
Much of the same analysis can be extended from news and nonfiction
to art and fiction.370 Unlike the first, disputes over the second type of
expressive use occur with some regularity.371 There often are plausible
arguments that these expressive uses could cause some confusion, such as
the survey evidence introduced by the owners of the PLAY PEN in the Grand
Theft Auto case.372 But here, as in the case of news reporting, the speech
interests are very significant. Moreover, the defendants prevailed in all those
cases cited above as examples of such expressive uses.373 Generalizing from
this small sample is imprecise, but it seems fair to conclude that the risk of
false negatives is extremely low—that is, there are very few expressive uses
within artistic works that would cause enough confusion to overcome the
speech interests at stake, even with a fuller review of the particular facts.
insurers and distributors create a chilling effect; a clear safe harbor should provide more clarity
to users such as this filmmaker.
369. Packman, 267 F.3d at 634.
370. This would include titles now covered by Rogers v. Grimaldi. Titles are more similar to
brand names, and therefore related consumer confusion may be both more likely and more
harmful. Of the handful of expressive uses cases that have rejected defendants’ arguments in
the last fifteen years, several involve titles. See generally, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d
437 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment for songwriters who had used the plaintiff’s
name as the title of a song); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d
727 (D. Minn. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction against use of the DAIRY QUEEN
trademark in film title). Nevertheless, I think the administrative costs of a more complex rule
for titles probably make it unwise. As with advertisements for news programs, the close linkage
of titles with expression justifies a safe harbor.
371. See generally, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Food Chain Barbie” photographs using BARBIE name and trade dress); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Barbie Girl” song mocking BARBIE doll); E.S.S.
Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2006), appeal
docketed, No. 06-56237 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006) (inclusion of adapted PLAY PEN trademarks in
video game); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003)
(appearance of CATERPILLAR bulldozers driven by anti-environmental bad guys in George of the
Jungle 2); Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(foolish use of trademarked SLIP ’N SLIDE YELLOW by idiotic character in movie, causing
comedic injury); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(imitation of famous CHARLES ATLAS advertisement involving bully kicking sand at beach as
part of comic book story); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741
F. Supp. 1546, 1552–53 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (in TV movie, villainous corporate polluters called
“STARBRITE Batteries”; plaintiffs sell STARBRITE vehicle polishes); Emily Umbright, St. LouisBased Appliance Maker Emerson Sues NBC, ST. LOUIS DAILY REC., Oct. 6, 2006, available
at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4185/is_20061006/ai_n16773876 (describing
trademark lawsuit by maker of IN-SINK-ERATOR garbage disposal over use of product in NBC
TV series Heroes).
372. See E.S.S. Entm’t, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1046; supra note 127 and accompanying text.
373. Supra note 371.
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Furthermore, as this Article has stressed, the pre-litigation chilling effect
causes more harm to free speech values than do the results in individual
cases.
Categorical exclusions for news, commentary, and artistic works would
ameliorate several of the problems we have seen repeatedly with trademark
fair use. For cases that fell within the safe harbor, the exclusions would
replace ad hoc First Amendment balancing.374 Such a shift would reduce
administrative costs and create more certain substantive protection for
expressive uses. As a bonus, it would internalize First Amendment
requirements in these cases as part of trademark doctrine and not as an
extrinsic constitutional test.375
These exclusions have the additional advantage of breaking the vicious
cycle of expanding trademark rights. As noted earlier, the law shapes
expectations about the need for a license to use trademarks, and those
expectations in turn shape the law through the inquiry into consumer
confusion.376 Fair use rules that clearly protect expressive uses in most media
content would, over time, eliminate widespread misunderstanding about the
scope of trademark rights in these settings.377
Some other possible categorical rules present slightly trickier issues.
California’s right of publicity statute, for example, contains a carve-out for
use “in connection with . . . any political campaign.”378 In principle, this safe
harbor also could be adopted for trademark infringement. On its face, such
an exclusion would be simple to apply. It certainly identifies a form of
expressive use absolutely central to the purposes of free speech protection.
And electoral campaigns constantly use the common catch phrases and
imagery of advertising to draw voters’ attention, not just “TaftQuack,” but
also Walter Mondale asking Gary Hart, “Where’s the Beef?”379 and Ralph
Nader running television commercials that parodied MasterCard’s famous
“Priceless” marketing campaign.380 There are difficulties to work through:
what qualifies as a “political campaign”? And what of outright deceptions by
campaigns pretending to be their opponents, or raising money under false

374. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the First Amendment balancing test).
375. See Leval, supra note 57, at 1135; McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1211–14.
376. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (stating that over-cautious licensing
alters consumers’ understanding of the requirements of trademark law).
377. See Gibson, supra note 7, at 938–39 (stating that a change in law can change consumer
perceptions).
378. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
379. See Levy, supra note 37, at 1208–09 (using “Where’s the Beef” as an example of
trademark use in campaigns that ought to be permissible).
380. MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1046,
1047–51 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). Nader’s ad itself is posted on YouTube. Posting of
OnADateBob to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJOuPZKAspQ&feature=related
(Nov. 11, 2006).
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pretenses?381 Some creativity could overcome these obstacles. Candidates
eligible for this exemption could be defined, for example, by borrowing a
definition from federal election law.382 This more limited scope would
exclude some grass-roots organizations and individuals engaged in
nonelectoral political speech,383 but it would also help prevent abuse of the
safe harbor. The exclusion could also be narrowed in other ways: for
example, it might not cover fundraising activities, it might still allow suit by a
candidate’s opponents, or it might even shelter political candidates only for
expressive uses of nonpolitical trademarks.
Even with all of these limitations in place, the exclusion still would apply
to the examples of Mondale, Nader, and the “TaftQuack” duck. But the
number of subordinate clauses potentially necessary to define this safe
harbor may indicate that it has grown too complicated. If this rule broke
down from a simple proxy into a fact-specific inquiry, it would be better to
handle political uses of trademarks in another way. Most likely, the issues
here are still simple enough to permit design of a safe harbor. Crucially,
however, policymakers should remember the lesson that emerges from our
examination of current trademark fair use doctrine: well-intentioned efforts
to achieve perfect confusion prevention in each individual case can generate
too many administrative costs.
Past attempts to design similar safe harbors for particular uses in
copyright law admittedly have been met with similar problems of complexity
and serve as a further cautionary tale.384 Special educational exemptions
inserted into the statute, such as the TEACH Act,385 are so narrow,
excessively detailed, and tied to particular technologies that they are nearly
useless.386 Numerical “guidelines” for copyright fair use added to the
legislative history as nonbinding often become straitjackets instead.387 The

381. See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 90 (2d
Cir. 1997) (stating that any group distributing information in the name of a well-known
political party would cause “catastrophic” confusion); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Who Owns
“Hillary.com”? Political Speech and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 B.C. L. REV. 55, 92–93
(2008) (defining and discussing “political cyberfraud”).
382. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(2) (2000) (defining candidates by reference to their contributions
and expenditures).
383. See generally, e.g., Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal., 856 F. Supp.
472 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (involving a citizen coalition attempting to prevent closure of local candy
factory); Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(involving protestors objecting to construction of a prison at a former Olympic facility in Lake
Placid).
384. But see Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 57, at 1524–32 (responding to objections
against fair use safe harbors in copyright law).
385. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (2000) (supposedly providing safe harbor from infringement
liability for qualifying distance learning uses of copyrighted material).
386. See Fisher & McGeveran, supra note 7, at 43–50.
387. See Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO
ST. L.J. 599, 670–72 (2001) (arguing that minimum numerical guidelines often transform into
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complexities of these failed copyright fair use doctrines reinforce the great
import of simplicity and reduced administrative costs for effective doctrines
of this type.
Nevertheless, trademark is a different animal, and the lessons of
copyright may not be fully transferable. For starters, copyrights vest
automatically upon creation, but a trademark is granted based on factspecific circumstances and public perception. The scope of the initial right
also differs tremendously: at least as a prima facie matter, copyrights
prohibit virtually any form of use, while only uses likely to confuse (or, now,
dilute) violate trademark law. Because of these dissimilarities, the existence
of trademark rights is far more contingent on factual circumstances. Thus,
safe harbors may fit better in the trademark regime because they simply
present a different way to structure those decisive facts.
Moreover, notwithstanding the checkered history of category-specific
exemptions in copyright law, a number of prominent copyright scholars
have begun contemplating various forms of brighter lines and safe harbors
as potential cures for the woes of copyright fair use.388 This new exploration
of a move from standards to rules in some instances suggests strongly that
trademark fair use might benefit from similar thinking.389
Finally, there is the question of how to ground these new safe harbors in
the law. The ideal solution would be congressional amendment of the
Lanham Act. Unfortunately, this is not likely; the 2006 amendments passed
only as accompaniments to revisions of dilution standards, themselves
spurred by judicial interpretations Congress disfavored.390 The sloppy
drafting of the new dilution safe harbors (and similar copyright rules) is also
worrisome. Fortunately, common-law reasoning is alive and well in
trademark law. Indeed, the entire structure of likelihood of confusion
reasoning is extra-statutory. Just as courts created nominative fair use and
First Amendment balancing as common law, they could establish safe
harbors.391 If so, however, it would be best to use extremely clear language.
maximum standards); Rothman, supra note 7, at 1918–21 (describing and critiquing the
“Classroom Guidelines”); Fisher & McGeveran, supra note 7, at 56–57 (describing rules that
“shrink the scope of fair use and greatly limit the doctrine’s flexibility”).
388. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use, and Motion Pictures, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 715 (2007); Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 57.
389. Gibson, who is skeptical of the move in copyright fair use, argues that clearer rules
might be more effective in the context of trademark fair use. Gibson, supra note 7, at 936–39.
390. See Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1151–56 (2006) (discussing the origins of the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006); Joern, supra note 333, at 292–97 (discussing different viewpoints
from trademark law scholars on the purpose of the 2006 amendment).
391. See, e.g., Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007)
(establishing a rule that “using a company’s trade name to label a message board on which the
company is discussed” cannot qualify as trademark dilution); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of
Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding “as a matter of law” that
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C. OTHER PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS
As noted earlier, categorical exclusions cannot cover all expressive uses
without losing the very simplicity that makes them beneficial. Here, as so
often when designing legal structure, the perfect is the enemy of the
good.392 There are, however, other procedural changes that could reduce
administrative costs in cases that move past an initial safe harbor phase.
Courts should remain aware of the chilling effect on expressive uses and the
possible negative impact of their procedural decisions.
First, the sequence of litigation should not delay final adjudications or
increase administrative costs needlessly. Some courts have structured
doctrines such as section 33(b)(4) or nominative use in a way that actively
postpones their consideration until after likelihood of confusion has been
proven.393 More generally, routine judicial management can have the same
effect: if a court groups all summary judgment motions together and hears
them at the end of a fixed discovery period, then both sides must marshal
the evidence and arguments to support their view of likelihood of confusion,
regardless of any fair use doctrines that might have disposed of the case
more easily. (The result is much the same if a court simultaneously considers
all matters related to a motion for preliminary injunction.)
Hastening resolution should be imperative in expressive use cases, with
the same urgency courts display in reviewing other free speech cases. A
much simpler structure would maximize a defendant’s ability to achieve
early adjudication whenever possible. Defendants should be allowed to raise
a trademark fair use argument as a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment as soon as they gather the evidence necessary to
prevail.394 Properly designed, these doctrines should require a great deal less
evidence than proving likelihood of confusion, so there is no reason for the
court to force the defendant to wait until that stage. Consider the potential
for early decisions involving the copyright fair use defense395 or the safe

“[t]rademark law does not entitle markholders to control the aftermarket in marked
products”). But see Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse than We Think: Trademark Defenses
in a Formalist Age 38–48 (Oct. 10, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law
Review) (arguing that courts actually have limited authority to develop new trademark defenses
based on common law reasoning).
392. See VOLTAIRE, LA BÉGUEULE (1772) reprinted in 74A LEUVRES COMPLETES DE VOLTAIRE
203, 217 (Christine Mervaud et al. eds., 2006).
393. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005)
(mandating such postponement of nominative fair use); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 607–09 (9th Cir. 2005) (requiring, on remand from
the Supreme Court, that the trial court conduct likelihood of confusion analysis before
considering a section 33(b)(4) affirmative defense).
394. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing dismissal of complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted”); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) (“A party against whom relief is sought
may move at any time . . . for summary judgment . . . .” (emphasis added)).
395. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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harbor from defamation liability for Internet intermediaries.396 In marked
contrast to the intricate doctrinal sequences devised by the Third and Ninth
Circuits for trademark fair use doctrines, these nontrademark doctrines
promote flexibility and serve a screening function to eliminate
unmeritorious cases as early as possible.
Second, certain heightened burdens of proof, already implicit in many
courts’ decisions related to expressive uses, should be formalized. For
instance, decisions often indicate that a defendant’s negative commentary
about the markholder—especially important from a free speech
standpoint397—is also especially unlikely to cause source confusion.398
Courts should impose a presumption that criticism cannot violate trademark
law unless it is highly likely to cause confusion. In some ways, this structure
resembles the one used in some Second Circuit courts to analyze the First
Amendment defense.399 Those cases, however, generally go through the full
multifactor test before considering speech values as a thumb on the scale. A
clear presumption, in contrast, should make it extremely difficult to show
likelihood of success on the merits necessary to secure a preliminary
injunction, and it should also facilitate an early summary judgment without
conducting a full-blown likelihood of confusion analysis.
Finally, fee-shifting is another possible procedural tool to discourage
nonmeritorious litigation against expressive uses and support impecunious
defendants. There is already a provision of the Lanham Act allowing courts
to impose defense costs on plaintiffs in “exceptional cases.”400 The
photographer in “Food Chain Barbie” secured this relief, but in general it is
unusual.401 This presumption should shift. Courts should presume that
unsuccessful lawsuits against expressive uses represent exceptional cases
eligible for awards of attorneys’ fees unless the plaintiff can show that they
were particularly close cases. If nothing else, this might encourage and fund
more pro bono representation for defendants in these cases—and perhaps
even allow a decent living for some of the free culture crusaders now
graduating from our nation’s law schools.
This list is by no means comprehensive. It merely aims to illustrate that
reform oriented toward procedural structure rather than substantive
outcomes can help reduce the chilling effect on expressive uses of
trademarks. If some small margin of error allows slight consumer confusion,
the benefits for discourse are worth that risk.
396. See supra notes 357–58 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
398. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308–09 (9th
Cir. 1992) (suggesting that negative commentary implies a lack of markholder endorsement or
sponsorship).
399. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
400. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
401. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has identified the real threat to expressive uses of
trademarks. The danger does not come from a hostile judiciary or
substantive rules that unduly constrain speech. Quite the contrary: most
such cases that actually go through litigation eventually wind their way,
sooner or later, to resolutions that favor defendants. In the shadow of these
decided cases, however, a chilling effect has developed. Amorphous
standards, fact-intensive analyses, and lengthy litigation encourage riskaverse behavior by those who engage in expressive uses and by the
institutions who serve as gatekeepers for their speech.
Because it requires such expensive and time-consuming discovery and
briefing, the likelihood of confusion standard itself shoulders much of the
blame. But this Article also identified similar flaws in the five principal
trademark fair use doctrines (trademark use theory, section 33(b)(4)
descriptive fair use, nominative fair use, First Amendment balancing, and
dilution safe harbors).
Effective doctrine for protecting trademark fair use must offer rules that
minimize overlap and maximize predictability of reasoning as well as results.
It must avoid excessive entanglement with fact-specific inquiries. It must
enable, both theoretically and practically, resolution of the fair use issue
early in litigation. There are always hard cases, so no mechanism meets these
requirements in every situation. But rethinking the structural features of fair
use doctrine can reduce the chilling effect and improve protection of free
speech in trademark law.

